

MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
ONE SOLDIER'S STORY

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BRUCE E. STANLEY, MAJ, USA
B.S., Eastern Michigan University, Ypsilanti, Michigan, 1986
M.S.A., Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant, Michigan, 1997

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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
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
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
Approved by:


_____, Thesis Committee Chairman
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.


_____, Member
LTC Michael P. Coville, M.M.A.S.


_____, Member
LTC Walter E. Ketchik, M.A., M.M.A.S.

Accepted this 4th day of June 1999 by:


_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

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ABSTRACT

MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, ONE SOLDIER'S STORY by MAJ Bruce E. Stanley, USA, 116 pages.

The author's personal experience during one Military Operation Other Than War (MOOTW) will be examined in this thesis. One unit's pre deployment planning and training will be examined then compared to the actual operations conducted. Incumbent on the conclusions drawn from the results of the comparisons, recommendations will be made in the thesis on how to improve the training and preparations of one unit. Doctrine is examined to establish a base of understanding in the fundamental approach to conducting MOOTW. Current studies relating to MOOTW will be reviewed to determine trends in opinions and recommendations. The results of historical examples and current doctrine combined with current professional opinion leads to further recommendations in how to train units for MOOTW.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AAFES	Army Air Force Exchange Service
AAR	After Action Review
ADVON	Advance Party
AFR	Armed Forces Radio
AO	Area of Operation
ATC	Army Training Center
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
CA	Civil Affairs
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CARL	Combined Arms Research Library
CMTC	Combined Maneuver Training Center
CNG	National Governing Council
CPT	Captain
CQC	Close Quarters Combat
CS	Chemical Smoke
CSI	Combat Studies Institute
DOD	Department of Defense
ETS	End of Time in Service
FSB	Forward Support Battalion
HUMMV	High Mobility Medium Utility Vehicle
IG	Inspector General
IRT	Individual Readiness Training
JRTC	Joint Readiness Training Center
LST	Landing Ship Tank
LT	Lieutenant
LZ	Landing Zone
MAJ	Major
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
METL	Mission Essential Task List
MNF	Multi National Force
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MOUT	Military Operations in Urban Terrain
MP	Military Police
MRE	Mission Rehearsal Exercise
MTP	Mission Training Plan
MTW	Major Theater War
MWR	Morale Welfare and Recreation
NCO	Non Commissioned Officer
NVG	Night Vision Goggles
OC	Observer Controller

OOSM	Out of Sector Mission
OOTW	Operations Other Than War
OPTEMPO	Operational Tempo
PCS	Permanent Change of Duty Station
POI	Program of Instruction
POM	Preparation for Overseas Movement
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
R&R	Rest and Relaxation
RDC	Rear Detachment Commander
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RTO	Radio Telephone Operator
S-2	Intelligence Officer
S-3	Operations Officer
SAW	Squad Automatic Weapon
SF	Special Forces
SFC	Sergeant First Class
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SSC	Small Scale Contingencies
STX	Situational Training Exercise
TAC	Tactical Administration Center
TACSAT	Tactical Satellite
TOC	Tactical Operation Center
TRADOC	United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
UN	United Nations
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
USACGSOC	United States Army Command and General Staff Officers College
USAIC	United States Army Infantry Center
VTC	Video Tele Conference
WWII	World War Two

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The missions we get certainly are nontraditional – I have trained and established police forces, judiciary committees and judges, and prison systems; I have resettled refugees, in massive numbers, twice; I've negotiated with warlords, tribal leaders, and clan elders; I have distributed food, provided medical assistance, worried about well-baby care, and put in place obstetrical clinics; I've run refugee camps; and I've managed newspapers and run radio stations to counter misinformation attempts.

I am an infantryman of 30 years standing. Nowhere in my infantry training did any body prepare me for this.¹

LTG Anthony Zinni, "Its Not Nice and Neat"

This thesis examines and places in critical perspective the experience of one soldier during Operation Uphold Democracy. Beginning with the historical account of one unit's predeployment planning and training, the study proceeds to relate the preparation to the actual operations conducted in Haiti. Proper assessment requires a review of doctrine to establish a base of understanding in the fundamental approach to conducting Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Finally the thesis will review current studies and articles relating to MOOTW to determine the emerging trends in opinions and practices regarding training. The evaluation of historical examples and current doctrine combined with current professional opinion will lead the thesis to further recommendations on how to train units for MOOTW.

The primary research question of this study is to determine whether or not the United States Army can prepare tactical units for the realities of a (MOOTW). Several secondary questions follow. Does the US Army doctrine address MOOTW? How is the Army currently training its units for MOOTW? Does the Army training methodology

prepare units for the realities of a MOOTW? What are the recommended changes or improvements to the current training methodology?

This is the story of how C Company, 4th Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment from the 25th Infantry Division (Light) met the challenge of changing a unit's training focus from a combat oriented mission essential task list (METL) to training tasks relating to MOOTW. The tasks associated with MOOTW require training that changes the combat oriented mind-set of the soldiers, units, and leaders to peace operations. While some MOOTW tasks were the same as the combat tasks the unit trained for during the previous fifteen months, a few tasks were new to the unit and its leaders. The conditions of the peace operation task differed from previous training and all the familiar task standards changed. The mental conditioning prior to the deployment reflected a focus on aggressive execution of combat battladrills relating to closing with and destroying an enemy. The mission in Haiti required an adjustment to this mental focus to something less than aggressive but not quite passive behavior. This challenged the unit's leadership from pre-deployment training through the execution of operations in Haiti. The unit leadership developed a graduated response matrix that helped leaders decide what level of force to use under a given set of conditions. The graduated response matrix was useful in determining the levels of response and complemented the rules of engagement. Training soldiers how to use the graduated response matrix provided the biggest training challenge for the unit leaders. Additionally, the unit focused on learning the rules of engagement (ROE) that reflected the parameters of the operation. Learning the ROE proved easy. Applying the ROE to the tasks, new conditions, and standards provided a continuous challenge. At one point during the deployment a squad leader, team leader,

and soldier were reprimanded for conducting an operation with ammunition loaded in a M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW). Training and conducting operations with loaded weapons were normal, if not mandatory, individual tasks for infantrymen in C Company prior to Operation Uphold Democracy. During the deployment, the ROE prohibited belt ammunition from being loaded in the M249 unless approved by the chain of command. This example reflects the challenges leaders and soldiers face when shifting focus from training for combat operations to MOOTW.

Overall this study is important for several reasons. First, it will contribute a historical view of a part of Operation Uphold Democracy. To date the historical writings available for Operation Uphold Democracy are limited. Second, the Army is conducting MOOTW everyday. Acknowledging this, the Army leadership must constantly review and improve the training for these types of operations. This study shows “a way” one unit prepared and executed a MOOTW and provides some lessons that can assist other units in the future to prepare for a MOOTW similar to Operation Uphold Democracy. Finally, training for MOOTW is a challenge to all leaders in the Army. With the deployment of mechanized infantry, armor, and cavalry units to Bosnia, all Army tactical units are experiencing the realities of training and executing MOOTW. Leaders are faced with the challenge of training their unit’s mission essential tasks under conditions and standards different from the Army’s doctrinal training manuals.

This study requires a standard definition of several terms. The 1997 version of the United States National Security Strategy uses the term “smaller-scale contingencies” to define operations that encompass the full range of military operations short of major theater warfare, including humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, disaster relief, no-fly

zone, reinforcing key allies, limited strikes, and interventions.² The National Military Strategy defines small-scale contingency operations as the capacity of the military to perform a show of force, opposed interventions, sanction enforcement operations, interposition or observation operations, peace operations, evacuation of noncombatants, counterterrorism, and combating the illegal drug trade.³ United States Army doctrine classifies activities during peacetime and conflict as operations other than war (OOTW) or military operations other than war (MOOTW). MOOTW is defined as military activities during peacetime and conflict that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces.⁴ Typical peacetime operations according to Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* are disaster relief, nation assistance, security and advisory assistance, counterdrug operations, arms control, treaty verification, support to domestic civil authorities, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, show of force, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, and attacks and raids. Figure 1 shows the types of historical small-scale contingencies the military conducts in comparison to major theater wars. By definition the U.S. military conducted significantly more peace operations than small-scale contingencies (SSC) or major theater wars (MTW). Only one out of every three past operations was a MTW or SSC.

FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, outline the three types of operations encompassed in peace operations. They include support to diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. Figure 2 shows the three types of peace operations and their related activities. Support to diplomacy is defined as peacemaking, peace building, and preventive diplomacy. Military support to diplomacy is ongoing and is subordinate to the diplomatic process. Many of these activities are conducted daily as part of peacetime

U.S MILITARY OPERATIONS

TRADITIONAL WARFARE (MAJOR THEATER WARS)		NON-TRADITIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS (SMALL SCALE CONTINGENCIES)	
TOTAL WAR/LIMITED WAR		EXPEDITIONS/CONTINGENCY OPNS	
AMERICAN WAR OF 1812		UNDECLARED NAVAL WAR with FRANCE	
REVOLUTION	MEXICAN WAR	BARBAY PIRATES	
CIVIL WAR SPANISH-AMERICAN		MORMON WAR	
WORLD WAR I	WAR	SECOND SEMINOLE WAR	
WORLD WAR II	KOREAN WAR	INDIAN WARS	
	VIETNAM WAR	BOXER REBELLION	
	DESERT STORM	INTERVENTION IN CUBA, 1906	
NON-TRADITIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS (PEACE OPERATIONS)		INTERVENTION IN MEXICO, 1914, 1916	
WHISKEY REBELLION		INTERVENTION IN RUSSIA, 1918-1920	
LEWIS AND CLARK EXPLORATION		OPERATIONS POWER PACK (DOM RE, 1965)	
RECONSTRUCTION IN SOUTH		OPERATION URGENT FURY (GRENADA, 1983)	
NATION BUILDING IN WEST		OPERATION JUST CAUSE (PANAMA, 1989)	
PULLMAN STRIKE			
NATION BUILDING IN THE PHILIPPINES			
NATION BUILDING IN CUBA, 1899-1909			
SAN FRANCISCO EARTHQUAKE RELIEF			
OCCUPATION OF HAITI, 1915-1934			
OCCUPATION OF DOM REP, 1916-24			
THE SANDINO AFFAIR, NICARAGUA			
CIVILIAN CONSERVATION CORPS			
CREEK CIVIL WAR, 1947-49			
HUK INSURRECTION IN THE PHILIPPINES, 1946-54			
NATION BUILDING IN VIETNAM			
		STABILITY OPERATIONS IN DOM RE, 1965-66	
		CIVIL DISTURBANCES IN U.S. 1960'S	
		COUNTER INSURGENCY IN LATIN AMERICA, 1960'S	
		MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT	
		PEACEKEEPING IN BEIRUT, 1982-1984	
		PEACEKEEPING IN THE SINAI	
		COUNTERINSURGENCY IN EL SALVADOR	
		STABILITY OPERATIONS IN GRENADA, 1983	
		INSURGENCY IN NICARAGUA, 1980'S	
		RAIDS ON LIBYA	
		OPERATION PROMOTE LIBERTY (PANAMA, 1990)	
		HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF	
		NEO IN SOMALIA	
		OPERATIONS RESTORE HOPE IN SOMALIA	
		OPERATION RESTORE DEMOCRACY IN HAITI	
		OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA AND MACEDONIA	

Figure 1. Instructional Chart, United States Army Command and General Officer Staff College. Department of Joint Operations. Course C500.

missions or stationing of the military abroad as part of a forward presence. Peacekeeping involves military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerent parties. They are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of existing truce agreements and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Peace enforcement is the application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions. The general purpose is to maintain or restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.⁵

Rules of engagement (ROE) are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitation under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other encountered forces.⁶ Rules of engagement are

TYPES OF OPERATIONS	
<u>SUPPORT TO DIPLOMACY</u>	<u>PEACEKEEPING</u>
PEACEMAKING MILITARY TO MILITARY RELATIONS SECURITY ASSISTANCE MILITARY EXERCISES PEACETIME DEPLOYMENTS PEACE BUILDING POST CONFLICT ACTIONS REBUILD CIVIL INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORT ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION RESTORE CIVIL AUTHORITY CONDUCT ELECTIONS DEMobilize FORMER BELLIGERENTS PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENTS SHOW OF FORCE INCREASED LEVELS OF READINESS	MONITOR TRUCES AND CEASE-FIRES REPORT AND MONITOR SUPERVISION INVESTIGATE COMPLAINTS AND VIOLATIONS NEGOTIATIONS AND MEDIATION LIAISON SUPERVISE TRUCES
	<u>PEACE ENFORCEMENT</u> RESTORE AND MAINTAIN ORDER AND STABILITY PROTECTION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE GUARANTEE AND DENY MOVEMENT ENFORCE SANCTIONS ESTABLISH AND SUPERVISE PROTECTED ZONES SEPARATE BELLIGERENTS

Figure 2. Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations*, 111.

used in all types of military operations, and they are a reality in the conduct of operations. ROE help accomplish the mission by ensuring the use of force is consistent with the military and political objective. It supports the units force protection and mission accomplishment. ROE used properly can prevent the unintended start of hostilities, provide an economy of force during hostilities, and protect the destruction of infrastructure necessary for future operations.⁷ A graduated response is the use of sequential levels of force employed by individuals or units in response to actions of and

opposing forces. A graduated response matrix is a tool used by commanders to outline the deliberate steps taken to counter or respond to actions encountered in a MOOTW environment. Graduated response typically complements the ROE. Figure 3 is an example of a graduated response matrix. Close Quarters Combat (CQC) is a series of tactics, techniques, and procedures used by small tactical units to conduct combat operations within close proximity to the enemy. CQC is typically conducted under the conditions of an urban environment.⁸ C Company focused on this as a primary training task during the predeployment training.

GRADUATED RESPONSE MATRIX		
CROWD CONTROL	CORDON AND SEARCH and	TACTICAL TRAFFIC CONTROL POINT
1. Leaflets	1. Speaker Team (Linguist)	
2. Linguist	2. Members of Family and Neighbors	
3. Airborne Speaker Team	3. Rev Engines (Mech Vehicle at door)	
4. Bull Horn	4. Have dog bark	
5. Dry Erase Boards on 2x4s	5. Inner Cordon - Shouting Commands	
6. Loud Noise Speaker Teams	6. Helicopter flyover/low hover	
7. Honk Horns	7. Employ CS	
8. Concertina	8. Shoot rounds in the air	
9. Start Up Vehicles - Rev Engines	9. Go in Hot - Break down doors	
10. Use Mechanized Vehicles		
11. Take Pictures - Point Out Instigators		
12. Employ Dogs	LOOTING	
13. Fix bayonets	1. Linguist	
14. Civil Disturbance Drill	2. Airborne Speaker Team	
15. Pepper Spray	3. Loud Noise Speaker Teams	
16. Show CS Canisters	4. Employ Dogs	
17. Employ CS	5. Fix bayonets	
18. Helicopter Wash	6. Civil Disturbance Drill	
19. Shoot Rounds in the Air	7. Pepper Spray	
20. Employ Deadly Force	8. Show CS Canisters	
	9. Employ CS	
	10. Helicopter Wash	
	11. Shoot Rounds in the Air	
	12. Employ Deadly Force	

Figure 3. From Authors Records

This study assumes the Army intends to continue focusing its military education system and homestation METL training on its primary mission essential tasks of warfighting. The Army doctrinal warfighting focus remains constant. The Army continues to participate in all MOOTW directed by the National Command Authority

(NCA). All military operations have some or all forms of MOOTW therefore all Army tactical units are subject to participating in one of the types of Peace Operations.

This study focuses on one soldier's personal experience while commanding C/4-87 IN during the preparation and deployment to Operation Uphold Democracy and later while assigned to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) as an observer controller. Personal records and interviews provide the original sources to describe the unit's pre-deployment training and the post deployment lessons learned.⁹ Additional sources of information come from unit historical data stored in the Archives of the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL). The original sources include data not critically reviewed by any other academic sources

The study is restricted to a historical review of the Operation Uphold Democracy during a 120-day timeframe from December 1994 through March 1995. Other units' and individuals' experiences may differ based on the situation and conditions during the operation. The lessons learned, conclusions, and recommendations are deliberately stated in broad terms to allow application to other MOOTW similar to Operation Uphold Democracy.

The research literature available on Operations Uphold Democracy and the training challenges associated with MOOTW similar to Operation Uphold Democracy fall into several categories; doctrine, original sources, and works within the academic and professional field. Doctrine sets the foundation for the thesis. The original sources, including interviews, provide the historical information. The literature on MOOTW provides a means to conduct a comparative analysis between the historical review and other lessons learned in relation to MOOTW.

The literature base for the thesis is US Army doctrine. Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, provides the foundation for all military operations. Other doctrinal sources include the *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*; FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*; FM 100-20, *Operations Other Than War*, US Army Infantry School *White Paper*, *Peace Enforcement Operations at Brigade and Battalion Level*; and TC 7-98-1, *Stability and Support Operations Training Support Package*. This doctrine is a statement of how America's Army, as part of a joint team, intends to conduct war or MOOTW. It is a condensed expression of the Army's fundamental approach to fighting, influencing events in MOOTW and deterring actions detrimental to national interests. It establishes a shared professional culture and approach to operations, and serves as the basis for curriculum in the Army school system. Doctrine is intended to be broad and forward looking. It sets the conditions necessary for the Army to exploit technology. It seeks to meet the challenges facing the Army by providing guidance.¹⁰

The original sources employed here include unit pre-deployment training plans, unit historical review of Operations Uphold Democracy prepared by the staff of 4-87 IN, the 3rd Brigade, and the 25th Infantry Division (Light), records of daily operations conducted in Haiti, post deployment lessons learned briefing and written after-action reviews (AARs). This study uses feedback from several former key leaders of units to include the brigade commander, the battalion commander, and the company first sergeant. The original sources provide the historical reference necessary to review the training and the execution of the operation. They also provide an indication of how the unit leadership interpreted the tasks and commanders intent during training and execution

of the operation. These are a critical link to the lessons learned and recommendations in the final two chapters.

To date very little critical research or historical writing by participants or the academic community has occurred in reference to Operation Uphold Democracy. Accounts by journalist are available discussing the operation. Some original unpublished documents are available that include unit operations orders, logs of current operations, briefings conducted during the current operation, unit standard operating procedures, and unit post deployment lessons learned. On a broader perspective, MOOTW is addressed in publications, journals, unpublished articles, and in student theses. Some of the works are theses and monographs by United States Army Command and General Staff Officers College (USACGSOC) students and others are from academicians and senior military leaders. These works provide a current perspective that typically relates to personal involvement in a MOOTW. The topics range from training, unit composition, the validity of MOOTW as a military operation, and doctrinal sources for MOOTW, to overviews of MOOTW in recent military history. Though the topics vary, the opinions of the authors tend to reflect a concern for the dilemma of combat units participating in a MTOOW and the effects on the readiness of the units. Most of the studies conducted provide a frame of reference for this study. The research and conclusions of each study and article enable the author to compare the evidence in this study to the lessons learned and opinions with similar studies and articles. This enables a critical review of trends to date and a review of areas not previously explored. It is fair to conclude that MTOOW, specifically Operation Uphold Democracy, requires further critical research. This study can help fill the void.

The study concludes with recommendations for Army tactical commanders and staff officers to consider when training units for MOOTW similar to Operation Uphold Democracy. The intent is for the recommendations to be logical in development, yet thought provoking, about the challenges of training for a MOOTW.

The Road to Operation Uphold Democracy

Haiti is the oldest black republic and, after the United States, the second-oldest republic in the Western Hemisphere. Haiti became an independent nation in 1804 after a bloody revolution. In 1822, Haiti conquered Santo Domingo, the eastern, Spanish-speaking portion of Hispaniola. In 1844, Santo Domingo broke away from Haiti and became the Dominican Republic. From 1843 until 1915, Haiti experienced 22 changes of government and a turbulent period of intense political and economic disorder. From 1915 through 1934, the United States intervened militarily during an especially unstable period.¹¹

In 1957, Francois Duvalier was elected president following a year of political turmoil during which six different governments held power. He declared himself president for life in 1964 and maintained political control until his death in 1971.¹² During Duvalier's rule, a small black middle class emerged, but Haiti suffered from domestic political tension, severe corruption, political repression, and economic stagnation. The United States suspended all economic and military assistance to the government of Francois Duvalier in 1963; aid was resumed for one year in 1973. Duvalier's son Jean-Claude assumed the presidency and continued many of his father's policies. The country experienced a period of economic recovery and investment, but

Jean-Claude failed to provide the leadership necessary for Haiti's sustained development. The country stagnated politically and economically, and public discontent mounted. On February 7, 1986, after months of tension and civil disorder, Jean-Claude fled Haiti for France. A military regime the National Governing Council (CNG) led by General Henri Namphy inherited power following the flight of Jean-Claude Duvalier.¹³

In late 1986, the CNG organized local and Constituent Assembly elections. In March 1987, a national referendum approved a new democratic constitution. Due to popular discontent with the CNG repression general elections scheduled for November 1987 were cancelled. In January 1988, Leslie Manigat was elected president. Manigat, a moderate conservative, was toppled by the military after only four months in power, and General Namphy again took control. Namphy was overthrown by elements of the military in September 1988, and another military regime, headed by General Prosper Avril, took power. Avril permitted the formation of an Electoral Commission to prepare for long-awaited elections, but Avril's increasingly authoritarian leadership eroded public confidence in his commitment to democracy. On March 12, 1990, due to civil unrest, Avril resigned in favor of Supreme Court Justice Ertha Pascal Trouillot, who became Provisional President.¹⁴

In December 1990, an overwhelming majority elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide president. He was a Roman Catholic priest and long-time opponent to Haiti's former dictatorship. International observers from the United States, United Nations, and Organization of American States declared the election to be Haiti's first free and honest election. Voters also elected members of parliament and mayors of Haiti's major towns. Aristide was inaugurated on February 7, 1991.¹⁵

On September 30, 1991, Aristide was overthrown by dissatisfied elements of the military and left the country for Venezuela; then he moved to the United States. From October 1991 to June 1992, an unconstitutional regime, led by Joseph Nerette as President and Jean-Jacques Honorat as Prime Minister, governed with the support of a parliamentary majority and the armed forces.¹⁶

In June 1992, both Nerette and Honorat resigned, and parliament, with the support of the armed forces, approved Marc Bazin as Prime Minister to head a new government. Nerette was not replaced because President Bazin's mandate was to negotiate a solution with President Aristide in order to end the economic embargo and diplomatic isolation of Haiti imposed after Aristide's ouster. In June 1993, Bazin resigned and the UN imposed an oil and arms embargo, which brought the Haitian military to the negotiating table.¹⁷

President Aristide and the then head of the Haitian Armed Forces, General Raoul Cedras, signed the UN-brokered Governors Island agreement on July 3, 1993, establishing a ten step process for the restoration of constitutional government and the return of President Aristide by October 30, 1993. As part of this process, Robert Malval was sworn in as Prime Minister on August 30, 1993. The military derailed the process and the UN again imposed economic sanctions. Prime Minister Malval resigned on December 15, 1993, but remained as acting Prime Minister for 11 more months.¹⁸

In May 1994, the military installed a third regime, illegitimately selecting Supreme Court Justice Emile Jonaissant to be provisional president. In May 1994 the UN and the US reacted to this by tightening economic sanctions and their enforcement (UN Res. 917). By the end of July 1994, the international community suspended all commercial air passenger flights with Haiti and Haiti's military restricted travel across the

land border with the Dominican Republic. On July 31, 1994, the UN adopted resolution (940) authorizing member states to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure of Haiti's military leadership and restore constitutional rule, including the return of President Aristide.¹⁹

The political and human rights climate continued to deteriorate as the military and the government maintained repression and terror, sanctioning widespread assassination, killing, torture, beating, mutilation, and rape in open defiance of the international community's condemnation. With UN authority to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure of Haiti's military leadership and restore the constitutional government, including President Aristide, President Clinton dispatched former President Jimmy Carter, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn, and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell to Haiti on September 16, 1994, to meet with the Haitian leadership. The purpose of their trip was to discuss the departure of the leaders within the framework of goals established by President Clinton and the UN Security Council. Facing imminent military intervention by the United States and a coalition of multinational forces, the regime leaders agreed to step down from power by October 15.

The agreement signed by former President Carter and the military-installed Haitian President Jonaissant included the following: the Haitian military and police agreed to work in close cooperation with the US military mission to achieve a smooth transition to the return of President Aristide and constitutional government to Haiti. The regime consented to retirement by Generals Cedras and Biambry and LTC Francois in accordance with UN resolutions 917 and 940 when a general amnesty would be voted

into law by the Haitian Parliament, or by October 15, 1994, whichever came first. The authorities also agreed to work with the Haitian Parliament to expedite this action and accept that their successors would be named according to the Haitian constitution and military law. The agreement also guaranteed that the economic embargo and economic sanctions would be lifted without delay in accordance with relevant UN resolutions, and that forthcoming legislative elections would be held in a free and democratic manner.²⁰

On September 19, US forces began a peaceful deployment to Port-au-Prince and other points throughout the country to establish a safe and secure environment for the legitimate government to take up its responsibilities. During the next several weeks, about 20,000 US troops and a battalion of nearly 300 from Caribbean Community (CARICOM) nations, under the command of US General Henry Shelton, deployed to accomplish this mission. Cedras and Biamby, accompanied by family members and some staff members, departed for exile in Panama on October 13. Francois was offered exile in the Dominican Republic on October 4.

The entry into Haiti by the 10th Mountain was unopposed by the Haitian Army. The primary “threat” was not the Haitian Army, but civil disorder and lawlessness. Haitian on Haitian violence was the primary challenged the U.S. soldiers in Port au Prince. On 24 September 1994 the Marines killed ten Haitians in Cap Haitien when they tried to resist.²¹ This rare engagement was the only Haitian Army resistance. From September 1994 through January 1995 the 10th Mountain Division conducted peace enforcement operations in Haiti. In November 1994 the 25th Infantry Division (Light) received the alert notification to conduct a relief in place of the 10th Mountain in Haiti.

3rd Brigade, with 4-87 Infantry Battalion receive official notification in early December 1994 to relieve 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain in Cap Haitien, Haiti in January, 1995.²²

Nearly thirty countries committed to participate with the US in the multinational force: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Israel, Jordan, the Netherlands, Norway, Panama, the Philippines, Poland, and the United Kingdom. In addition to twelve of the thirteen members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM): Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago.

The purpose of the MNF was to maintain a secure environment and ensure a smooth transition to democracy, help restore democracy by professionalizing the military, training a new Haitian police force, maintaining civic order, and protecting Haitian Government personnel and facilities, as well as the staffs of human rights and humanitarian organizations.

¹Zinni, Anthony. "It's Not Nice and Neat." *USACGSOC, Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting, DJMO Selected Readings Book* Vol. I. Fort Leavenworth. Kansas, 1998.

²The White House. "A National Security Strategy for a New Century." Washington, DC, May 1997.

³Shalikashvili, John M. "National Military Strategy." Washington, DC, 1997, 12.

⁴Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-23: *Peace Operations*. Washington D.C.: 30 Dec 1994, 111.

⁵Ibid., 2-6.

⁶Ibid., 112.

⁷United States Department of Defense, *Joint Task Force Commanders Handbook for Peace Operations*, Joint Warfighting Center, 16 June 1997, I-14.

⁸Department of the Army "Operations Other Than War Training Support Package, Close Quarter Combat OOTWZ206." U.S. Army Infantry School, Combined Arms Tactics Directorate, Fort Benning, Georgia. January 1994, 1,20.

⁹The brigade commander directed the author to developed three unit training plans. A six-week plan, a four-week plan, and a two-week plan. The brigade commander implemented the two-week plan. The author only kept the two-week plan the others were discarded.

¹⁰Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*. Chapter 1.

¹¹ Haggerty, Richard. *Dominican Republic and Haiti Country Studies*. Headquarters Department of the Army. Washington, DC: 1991, 213.

¹²Ibid., 231.

¹³Heinl, Robert D., and Nancy G. Heinl. *Written in Blood. The Story of the Haitian People, 1492-1995*. Lanham, Maryland, University Press of America, Inc. 1984, 607.

¹⁴Ibid., 732.

¹⁵*Haiti-A Case Study*, 18.

¹⁶Ibid., 18.

¹⁷Ibid., 19.

¹⁸Ibid., 14.

¹⁹Ibid., 23.

²⁰Ibid., 23.

²¹Department of the Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned. CALL, Haiti D-20 to D+150, 1.

²²Department of the Army, Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Light), MNF Cap Haitien, Haiti, APO AE 09320-3080. Brigade S3 Executive Summary, 27 March 1995.

CHAPTER 2

PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING

In late November 1994, the 3rd Brigade commander formed a planning cell consisting of the 4-87 IN battalion executive officer MAJ Al Sweetser, the 4-87 IN C Company commander, and the 4-27 IN B Company commander CPT Joe Dichario. He directed them to develop a predeployment training plan for the battalion. The commander provided the group with the “7th ATC White Paper,” the USAIC “OOTW Close Quarters Combat (CQC), Training Support Package,” and a series of vignettes developed by the 10th Mountain Division.¹ The commander instructed the group to develop a plan that could be executed given two, four, or six weeks available time. He told the group to develop the plan assuming unlimited resources and unrestricted access to all training facilities on Schofield Barracks. The ability to plan unconstrained enabled the planners to include all ranges and training areas on post, increased ammunition requirements, non-standard range firing, and training scenarios. Additionally he wanted the training to begin with individual CQC training, followed by collective live fire training in the tire house, then followed by unit training on specific tasks relating to the vignettes provided. Included in the plan was leader training prior to each event, rules of engagement (ROE) training and graduated response training. “What if” discussions and classes on all the vignettes were to center around the legal and ethical dilemmas leaders and soldiers might face.

Within twenty four hours three plans were developed and presented to the commander. The training tasks remained consistent throughout each plan but the time available was adjusted based on the number of training days available. The brigade commander chose the two week plan, directed refinement of the plan which limited training to daylight hours only to enable soldiers to spend the maximum amount of time with families prior to deployment. Additionally, two long weekends were inserted into the training plan around Christmas and New Years Day. His intent was a balance between training and maximizing the soldiers' time with their families. With this new guidance the planners began requesting the resources necessary to implement the training plan. The plan covered two general areas; CQC and specific tasks. Embedded within each area were the application of the ROE and the use of graduated response. The conditions changed for each task to reflect various levels of difficulty. Leaders trained on all tasks prior to conducting collective training. The plan was aggressive given the constraint of only two weeks training time. This required all leaders to understand the training plan and meet the training standard within the tight time schedule.

The brigade commander's intent for conducting these particular training tasks relates directly to his mission analysis of the situation in Haiti. After completion of his leader's reconnaissance in Haiti and conducting a commander's mission analysis he determined the most significant threat facing the unit was one armed individual, in one room of a building, with one or more noncombatants in the building with him at night. The commander wanted to focus the training on addressing this worst case event. He felt if the leaders and soldiers could handle this situation, they could easily adjust to other

situations that would not be as challenging. Additionally, the commander wanted the training to address the specific tasks the units would conduct in Haiti. These included presence patrols, fixed site security, convoy operations, and checkpoint operations. Embedded in all of the tasks were the rules of engagement and the requirement to understand and use the graduated response. The commander's intent for this training was to instill confidence in the soldiers and leaders, build a cohesive team, and insure that everyone understood the ROE and how to use them with the graduated response, and that units were familiar with the tasks they would perform in country.²

The training culminated with platoon and company situational training exercises (STX). The STX focused on four events; platoon fixed site security, platoon presence patrol, platoon convoy operation, and a company cordon and search. Appendix A (STX Training) shows the layout of the STX lanes.³ Within each event the conditions included application of the ROE, interaction with civilians interplay, the media, and non-governmental organizations. Each event challenged the small unit leader with the worst case scenario and multiple events to cause the leader to make decisions in a constrained environment. Each STX concluded with after action reviews (AARs) that focused on what happened, why it happened, and how the unit could improve on the tasks. Observer Controllers (O/Cs) from the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and subject matter experts (SMEs) from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) provided feedback and advice to the unit. The participation by JRTC and CALL set a standard for their participation in future predeployment training, such as the Mountain Eagle exercises at the Combined Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in Germany.⁴ Figure 4 shows the calendar

of events for December 1994 and January 1995. Appendix B is a detailed outline of the training plan.

Charlie Company began predeployment training on 8 December 1994. The commander and first sergeant began leader training focusing at the squad and platoon level. During the leader training the platoon sergeants prepared the platoons for the training and the deployment. Leader training began with an overview of the training plan followed by training, at the rifle range, on how to conduct close quarters combat (CQC) marksmanship. The CQC marksmanship training consisted of reflexive shooting, target discrimination drills, and collective battle drills under various conditions.

Reflexive shooting requires the soldier to fire his assigned weapon at targets placed at the distance of four, seven, and ten meters. The standard is to fire one round at a specific location on the target. The soldier is standing, facing the target, with his weapon carried at the ready position or held in a relaxed position at his waist. When instructed the soldier lifts his weapon rapidly to a shoulder firing position and engages the target with a single round. The purpose of the drill is to train the soldier to quickly or reflexively fire his weapon at a specific target. When the soldier becomes proficient with this drill the conditions change requiring the soldier to stand perpendicular to the target or face away from the target, then turn and engage the target. This requires the soldier to acquire the target, turn his body and weapon to face the target, and to fire at the target.

One example of the commands a soldier encounters when conducting the reflexive drill is "Four paces, turn, ready, engage." The soldier begins by facing away from the target, walks four paces, turns, acquires the target, shoulders his weapon and engages the target.

DECEMBER 1994

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
				1	2	3
Block Leave						
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Prep for Tng, Leader Tng, Vignette Discussions, Driver Tng						
Vehicle Prep, Load Scale Inspect JI Load CONEXs						
Block Leave						
11	12 POM Unit Claims	13 Class: FLD Order Officer	14 Bn Run CIF Issue CDR Briefs Bd FSG Brief	15 POM VEH LOAD CIF Issue Deploy Prep	16 Ldr Tng POM Veh in AHA Range Prep	17 Bn Holiday Ball
Block Leave						
Vehicle Prep, Load Scale Inspect JI Load CONEXs						
Leader Tng, Vignette Discussions.						
18	19 Div Run POM Ldr Tng (CQC) Indiv Weapons: Zero/Qual	20 LDR Tng	21	22	23	24
Load Ro Ro						
HHC Convoy Ops Tng						
CQC Marksmanship						
25	26 Ro Ro Sails	27 POM M/U A: BD6 STX B: CQC (MAC) C: Tire House	28 A: CQC (MAC) B: Tire House C: BD6 STX	29 A: Tire House B: BD6 STX C: CQC (MAC)	30	31
Tng Holiday						
STX Vignettes each day (Tire House, MAC, CTF)						

JANUARY 1995

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
1	2 FSG Brief	3 ADVON DEPARTS	4	5	6 ROE, Country Briefs, Intel Update Force Protection, SAEDA, Prev Med, Hygiene	7
Training Holiday						
8	Classes: Relief in Place SOP Review ROE Review	RoRo Arrives 10	11 FSG Brief	12	13 Bn Tng Holiday	14
Marksmanship Make-up Lifeguard Certification Final POM (SGLI, POA, Wills, etc) Close out Barracks, POV Storage, RD Property Trans						
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
Battalion Deployment Window						
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

Figure 4. From Author's Personal Records

The importance of the drill is to instill in the soldier the ability to quickly identify that a threat exists, acquire the threat, and engage the threat with his assigned weapon. All soldiers conducted this training using a M16A2 rifle.

Target discrimination drills build upon the reflexive shooting drill by adding the requirement for the soldier to acquire and engage a specific portion of the target. The reflexive shooting techniques are used to engage the target but the soldier must discriminate between portions of the target and only fire at the portion of the target identified as a threat. The distance to the targets is the same as in the reflexive shooting drill. Various colors and shapes are placed on the targets and are used as the stimulus for the soldier to focus on while shooting. Figure 5 gives an example of the target configuration. When the drill begins the soldier is not given a time standard for the discrimination drills. When accuracy and confidence improve a time standard is added. The addition of a time standard requires the soldier to engage targets by firing a single round or controlled pairs under more difficult conditions and requires additional decisions by the soldier under a time constraint.

One example of this drill is a soldier begins by standing and faces away from the target. He receives the command "squares, seven meters, controlled pairs, eight seconds, engage." Under these conditions the soldier turns and faces the target, acquires the seven-meter target, raises his rifle to a standing firing position, and only engages the square on the target with two rounds within eight seconds. Leaders can change conditions as the soldier's confidence and accuracy improve. Other conditions include increasing the speed

of engagements, having the soldier jog towards or away from the target, and conducting the firing under limited visibility with night vision goggles (NVGs).

Reflexive and Discrimination E-Type Target




Figure 5. Author's Recreation of Target

Increasing the restrictions on firing the individual weapon requires the soldier to deliberately acquire a target and think about the engagement, develop experience, build confidence, and mentally prepare to address threats in a restrictive environment. The reflexive and discrimination drills establish a foundation where the soldier's situational awareness is heightened and the accuracy of the rifle engagement at close quarter increases. Upon completion of this individual training the fire teams and squads can begin training on the collective task of entering and clearing a room within a building.

Enter a building and clear a room is a squad battle drill in FM 7-8, “Squad and Platoon Battle Drills.” C Company habitually trained on this during the previous 15 months under a variety of conditions. During the pre-deployment training the focus of the collective training included clearing one or more rooms with one or more teams. The training conditions included day and night, with and without non-combatants, blank and live fire, and under restrictive rules of engagement. The purpose of training this collective task focused the fire teams and squads on the critical task involved in addressing the worst case threat identified by the brigade commander’s mission analysis.

For the next seven days the company leadership trained on developing the individual and collective CQC skills. The leaders included reviews of the rules of engagement and graduated response during periods they were not involved directly in the training. The seriousness and focus of the company leaders and soldiers enhanced the quality of the training.

Training on the collective tasks of presence patrols, check point operations, fixed site security, and convoy operations complimented the CQC training. Each task was new and unique to the company. A light infantry platoon conducts patrols as part of its combat operation. This is typically done to make contact as a combat patrol, or to avoid contact and gather information as a reconnaissance patrol.⁵ The presence patrol requires the platoon to expose itself and be as visible as possible. The inherent protection provided by stealth, dispersion, and aggressive pro-active engagements (shooting the enemy prior to being shot) when conducting combat patrols is negated when conducting a presence patrol. Therefore the mindset of an infantryman must change to deal with this new

condition. The challenge leaders faced when training presence patrols included maintaining security, situational awareness, and alertness, but not the projection of an overt threat. The small details challenged the leaders such as how the weapon was carried, who smiled and waved, how the unit conducted overwatch or security, and how the unit moved as a unit along a busy street. New standard operating procedures (SOPs) were developed to deal with these challenges based on the conditions the unit would face while in Haiti.

How to operate a checkpoint involved additional challenges to the company leadership. The idea of standing out in the open, dealing with civilians, and conducting searches was an alien concept for the soldiers and company leadership. Leader training helped in refining the techniques for conducting this task. Input from MPs, procedures used by 10th Mountain, and personal experience of several leaders assisted in developing the SOP for the company. The basic idea of the checkpoint boiled down to establishing an ambush. The principal organization of the ambush remained constant with security, overwatch, assault, search, and medical teams in place. The conditions differed in that each of these teams was overt and the "kill zone" was a very small area. The overwatch element relied on designated marksman and not crew served weapons. The platoons were able to understand the basic principles of conducting a checkpoint by taking the principles of ambush and altering the conditions to fit the environment of Haiti.

Fixed site security proved tough when civilians were introduced as part of the condition. Dealing with a civilian whose intentions were unknown proved challenging to soldiers who were used to dealing with an enemy threat that shoots. Fixed site security is

basically a defense of a designated location. Establishing and maintaining security is the key to this task. It is incumbent on the leader to adjust to the conditions of the site to be secured. Typically the unit leaders established a defense or security position in a wooded environment. The challenge was to get the leader to understand different conditions and apply the basic defensive principles to a fixed site. Identifying fields of fire, controlling access, using the ROE, maintaining command and control, and having a quick reaction force available were critical tasks for the platoons. The intent was for soldiers and leaders to apply the principles used in a wooded area to an urban area or a non-standard site. Adding the conditions of noncombatants and a small threat enable the platoons to apply the ROE and graduated response under various conditions. Flexibility and mental agility enabled soldiers and leaders to adjust to the new conditions.

Conducting convoy operations involved learning skills never used by a light infantry platoon. With only one vehicle assigned to each rifle company, infantry platoons typically do not conduct normal operations mounted on vehicles. Understanding how to transfer the principles of security, movement, command and control, and land navigation in a mounted environment requires practice for the light infantryman. A soldier experienced in heavy operations may chuckle at this, but the SOPs and techniques mechanized infantrymen routinely conduct do not apply in light infantry operations. The intent for this training was to familiarize the soldiers and leaders with the challenges of conducting operations with vehicles.

Each critical task was compared to known doctrinal task and adjusted to meet the new conditions known to exist in Haiti. The known start points for a presence patrol are

the principles of patrolling. The principles of the defense apply to fixed site security. As mentioned earlier the task of conducting an ambush is adjusted to the conditions of operating a checkpoint and convoy operations based on doctrinal convoy operations with varying conditions. With these known areas as start points, the new conditions applied to each enabled the necessary adjustments to be made to fit the Haiti environment.

Through the medium of video teleconference (VTC) with the leadership of 2-87 IN provided input on how to conduct these tasks. 2-87 IN was conducting operations in the Cap Haitien area of Haiti and 4-87 IN would conduct a relief in place with this unit. They provided valuable insights on what to train, how they trained, and what they felt were the most important tasks of which to focus the training. This VTC was critical at the time to clarify the tasks and conditions. It also increased the confidence level of the unit leadership on the focus of the predeployment training being conducted. Some of the apprehension of the unknown disappeared after the VTC.

The company leadership faced the challenge of not only preparing the soldiers for deployment but also preparing families. This included family support plans, individual budget counseling, identifying family medical needs, special family needs, and identification of weak family relationships that could turn bad while the soldier was deployed. A few methods the unit leadership addressed included providing accurate data quickly about the deployment, making no promises about redeployment dates, providing the garrison agencies necessary to prepare families (SJA, AER, Red Cross, Family Support Networks, Chaplains, Medical, and Finance). "Mandatory" meetings for the families ensured everyone was informed. This process began immediately after

notification for deployment and continued throughout the redeployment. The real heroes of this effort included the spouse leadership of the C Company family support group. They volunteered a tremendous amount of time to provided a great amount of moral support to the company.

A unit preparation of overseas movement (POM) ensures soldiers have completed all the legal, dental, and medical requirements necessary to deploy. In addition, unit and individual equipment had to be loaded for movement by ship to Haiti. "Stay behind" equipment and real property had to be identified, accounted for, and signed over to the rear detachment commander. The VTC mentioned earlier assisted the unit in determining the equipment necessary for deployment.

The battalion limited C Company to deploying only 110 soldiers to Haiti. This number was less than the number assigned to the company. Tough decisions were made on who was going to deploy and for what reason (non-deployable). Some C Company soldiers would not deploy to Haiti. Initially this may seem easy, but telling a soldier he can not deploy on a real world mission with the unit he has trained with for the previous twelve months is a difficult task.

Assigning a rear detachment commander for the company also proved difficult. The requirement for rear detachment commander was for a NCO who was mature, responsible, and self motivated. The tasks necessary included maintaining control over the soldiers left behind who would ETS or PCS while the unit was deployed. The NCO chosen reluctantly performed this task in a superb manner.

The battalion filled several key leader vacancies in the company. Two of these included a platoon sergeant and a platoon leader. LT Rich Russo volunteered to deploy with the battalion to Haiti. He was an experienced platoon leader from 1-27 IN, a sister battalion in the brigade. He quickly integrated himself into the platoon and exceeded all expectations by quickly preparing them for deployment. SFC William McKeithan arrived in the company a few days after the deployment notification. He was assigned to the same platoon as LT Russo. Ironically, SFC McKeithan was the company commander's first platoon sergeant in the 10th Mountain Division (Light) eight years earlier. The commander teamed this young lieutenant up with this experienced NCO to form a superb leadership team to prepare first platoon to deploy.

The company received several replacement soldiers who were recent graduates of infantry basic training. These young soldiers had the toughest time during the pre-deployment training and initial phases of the operation. These soldiers faced the challenge of becoming members of a cohesive team that had trained together for the previous twelve months. The soldiers and leaders in C Company understood the importance of adding these new soldiers to the team and quickly brought them up to the company standard. The junior leaders worked aggressively reforming their team by ensuring each new soldier understood his role.

Unsure about the deployment to Haiti, several soldiers expressed a desire not to deploy. To their credit, the platoon chain of command quickly identified these folks and the first sergeant and commander addressed this with immediate and direct counseling. The key to success was to inform these young soldiers of what to expect and reinforce the

fact that the soldier made a commitment to the Army and he had a responsibility to the unit. Based on the individual soldier, this message was either directive or coercive. Regardless of the counseling technique, all of the soldiers expressing concern did deploy with the company and did very well individually and as part of the company team.

The commander conducted pre-deployment counseling of all leaders prior to beginning the training. The counseling focused on the standards and an expectation of leaders at all levels, during the training and the deployment. The counseling established the standards of discipline, team building, training, and expectations of responsibility during the pre-deployment training through the completion of operations in Haiti. The commander felt it was necessary to establish a common understanding of the requirements necessary to prepare, deploy, and re-deploy successfully from the operation. Appendix C (Initial Counseling) is an example of a squad leader's initial counseling statement.

The leaders reacted in two ways to the counseling. The first was positive with an understanding of the intent that the leader was empowered to train and lead his squad. These leaders felt the commander had displayed confidence in them by giving them responsibility to lead their unit. Others were skeptical and had a feeling the commander was conducting the counseling to cover himself in case something bad happened and the counseling statement could be used against the leader. Regardless, the counseling was effective by providing focus on the upcoming task.

Pre-deployment for C Company was planned and executed within four weeks of notification. During this timeframe pre-deployment training, unit preparation for deployment, and family preparation was balanced with a maximum amount of soldier and

family time. The unit leadership focused on realistic training and the soldiers adapted quickly to a variety of changes. This time was well spent in preparation for the deployment to Haiti.

¹ Department of the Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) *Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Operations Other Than War, Haiti. Vignette Training*.

² Authors interview with BG Spear, October 1998.

³ Sketch from the personnel records of the author.

⁴ The Mountain Eagle Exercises were mission rehearsal exercises for unit preparing to deploy to operations in Bosnia.

⁵ Department of the Army Field Manual 7-8, *The Infantry Platoon*, discusses the doctrine of patrolling to include tactics, techniques, and procedures.

CHAPTER 3

OPERATIONS IN HAITI

First Lieutenant Thomas Foster, the company executive officer, led Charlie Company's advance party (ADVON) into Haiti on 3 January 1995. The ADVON consisted of the company supply sergeant, the communications sergeant, company-designated drivers, and the armorer. Their tasks included receiving equipment arriving by ship, establishing the company living area, conducting liaison with the leadership from C Company, 2-87 IN and discussed the transition plan. The ADVON received the main body on 17 January 1995.¹

The company moved into the base camp at Cap Haitien in Northern Haiti and began the transition and relief in place with its sister company in 2-87 IN. Cap Haitien is the second largest city in Haiti and is the economic focus for northern Haiti.

The base camp, "Camp Catamount," was located at the airfield on the eastern edge of Cap Haitien. The camp was situated on a swampy area and built up with gravel several feet for better drainage. The camp held TF 4-87 IN consisting of the infantry battalion, a platoon of engineers, a platoon of MP's, a postal unit, a CA and PSYOP unit, a Armed Forces radio station, a small Army Airforce Exchange Service (AAFES) post exchange, the Brown and Root contractors, and the AT&T telephone contractor. Brown and Root operated and maintained the camp infrastructure. They provided base maintenance, fuel, laundry and bath facilities, a mess hall, and garbage disposal. Each function they performed reduced the requirements for the unit. AT&T provided a long distance

telephone service in the camp with about twenty phones available. The Post Exchange carried snacks, books and magazines, sodas, and toiletries, and some Uphold Democracy souvenir items.²

The transition with C Company, 2-87 IN consisted of leader discussions of tactics, techniques and procedures the 10th Mountain used to date. Leader reconnaissance of Cap Haitien provided a glimpse of the environment in which operations were conducted in the city. The salient observation was the number of people walking on the street and the difficulty of driving and conducting dismounted patrols. All company leaders conducted joint presence patrols in the city and a joint presence patrol out of the city. This enabled the C Company leadership to observe another unit's techniques and procedures and begin thinking about how they would apply these to their unit. Additionally, the company leadership reviewed the composition and mission of the Quick Reaction Force and the base camp security force.³

The battalion completed the relief in place and assumed operational control of operations in northern Haiti on 21 January 1995. For the next several months C Company would conduct several types of missions in Haiti. These were out of sector missions, out of city in sector missions, in city presence patrols, checkpoints, base camp security, the weapons buy back program, and quick reaction force. Each of these required a different task organization and preparation.

The battalion rotated the missions of each company on a weekly basis. The mission rotation schedule was base camp security, patrolling in the city, and out of sector missions. During the base camp security phase the company was responsible for the

weapons buy back program, and the quick reaction force. During the city patrolling the company was responsible for providing a presence in the U.S. sector of Cap Haitien. These patrols were mounted and dismounted. A CARICOM battalion and the Guatemalan Battalion each had a patrolling sector in Cap Haitien in addition to the U.S patrolling sector. When the company conducted out of sector missions two days were spent in preparation, two or three days conducting the mission, and one day for rest and recovery.⁴ Appendix D shows and example of the battalions mission rotation schedule.

Rotating the missions between each company enabled all the companies to gain experience conducting all the missions. Varying the environment in which the soldiers operated reduced complacency. The out of sector missions were by far the most popular missions with the soldiers.

Out Of Sector Missions

The out of sector missions required C Company to leave the Cap Haitien area, get out into the country of Haiti and interact with the local Haitien people. Charlie Company conducted its first out of sector mission to Point Labadi from 22-23 January. Point Labadi is a resort area owned and operated by Princes Cruise Line about 20 kilometers northeast of Cap Haitien. This out of city in sector mission focused on providing security at Point Labadi for the return of operations to Haiti by the cruise line.⁵ C Company conducted patrols of Point Labadi and established a cordon to prevent any interference to the cruise line operations. The opening of the resort and return of the cruise ship signaled a move

towards a secure and stable environment in Northern Haïti. After a three-year hiatus, tourism was returning to Haïti. C Company conducted the mission with no incidents. Though C Company prepared to prevent any disruption to Cruise Line operation, the two days at Point Labadi were uneventful. This mission was an indicator of the types of operations and the environment the company would encounter over the next three months.

The mission was unique from the standpoint that C Company moved from Cap Haïtien to Point Labadi by vehicle convoy and by an Army landing craft. The company executive officer led the ground element that consisted of one rifle platoon, the battalion commander and his TAC, and a medical team with the battalion surgeon. The company commander moved with two platoons on the landing ship tank (LST) from the port of Cap Haïtien along the northern coast of Haïti to Point Labadi.⁶

C Company conducted its second out of sector mission to St. Raphael and Don Don in north central Haïti. The three-day mission focused on updating the area assessment of the towns, providing a military presence in the towns, and broadcasting the latest messages from President Aristide to the local population.⁷

The area assessments provided updated information on the overall attitudes of the population, the economy, and the infrastructure. The military presence provided a show of force to the population to let them know that the US military was available to provide security assistance. Additionally, the presence added credibility to the Special Forces teams working in the area by providing a deterrent to any threats to the teams. The broadcasts by the loudspeaker teams provided updated information to the people in the countryside the latest developments in Port-au-Prince.

The company traveled 250 miles round trip during the three days. The convoy consisted of a total of sixteen vehicles to include troop transport, medical, and maintenance. The road conditions in central Haiti were improved gravel roads and unimproved dirt roads. It was important the convoy consist of HUMMVs only. The five ton truck was unable to negotiate some country roads and the small streets on the cities.

The first day the company traveled to the City of Don Don it set up a forward operating base at the airfield south of town.⁸ Markings on the one building at the airfield indicated the United States Marine Corps built the airfield in 1929. C Company was not the first American military presence the town of Don Don had seen. Presence patrols in Don Don determined the standard of living was pretty good in relative terms for Haitians. The town was clean. The local medical clinic had medical supplies. The market had a wide variety of reasonably priced items. The children were attending school and the people were did not seem concerned with the politics of Port-au-Prince. Interestingly, the mayor of the town was a retired U.S. Air Force Officer who had been living in Haiti for the previous eight years. He was not in town during our visits to Don Don, the company was told he went to Port-au-Prince for a few days.

The second day of the mission the company divided into two groups. The commander and one platoon traveled east to the towns of Pignon and Ronquitte to conduct area assessments. The town of Pignon was small and extremely poor. Most houses were made of mud and sticks, the local medical clinic had very few supplies, and the market was small and had very few goods for sale. Two men were being held in the jail for stealing food from the market in Ronquitte. The roads leading to the town were

deteriorating from lack of repair and upkeep. Ronquitte on the other hand is a very nice town for Haitian standards. The roads leading to the town were very bad but the town had very nice houses, a large Catholic Church, and a small but nice Protestant church. C Company met an American missionary family from Ohio who was living in the town and helping the community work on the road network around the town. The missionary and his wife had three daughters and a son. Another missionary couple lived in the town but had traveled to Cap Haitien for the day.⁹

One task the company performed at each town was to conduct an assessment of the local jail. The intent was to determine the conditions of the jail, the number of prisoners, and their treatment by the newly established police. In Ronquitte the company visited the town sheriff and his jail. The sheriff indicated he had one prisoner. A local woman was being held in the jail for allegedly stealing babies and eating them. She was accused by some of the locals of being a witch. The woman had been in jail for about a week when we arrived. The sheriff's primary concern was the protection of the woman from the locals in the town who wanted to see her punished. The company commander and the Special Forces NCO working with C Company spoke to the local judge about the situation. He indicated he was still gathering information and would not make any decisions for several more weeks. The sheriff was concerned he had no money to buy food to take care of the woman. He indicated the town council had not provided food or money to buy food for the woman. After interviewing the local leadership, it was determined this was a civil matter for the judge and local government to handle.¹⁰ The Special Forces team accompanying C Company planned on returning to Ronquitte the

following week to check on the progress of the local judicial system. The company completed the assessment of Ronquitte and moved to St. Raphel to link up with the remainder of the company.

The company executive officer led two platoons to St. Raphel to conduct the area assessment.¹¹ Accompanying C Company was the battalion executive officer, the battalion S-2, a civil affairs officer and several radio operators for the Tactical Satellite Communications. While in St. Raphel the Brigade commander flew in by helicopter and visited C Company. The town leadership of St. Raphel met with the Battalion XO and discussed the status of the town. They indicated there were no problems in the town since the removal of the Fad'H and supplies and goods for the market were beginning to arrive from Cap Haitien. The market was busy the two days the company was in town. The town leadership's only requested to C Company was for assistance in building the town a sports field for soccer. Curiously, when asked about a bridge the town leaders did not see a need for a bridge across the river.

The company remained overnight in St. Raphel and returned to Cap Haitien the following day. Following mission debriefings and an afteraction review, the company prepared to assume the in city-patrolling mission. While in Haiti the battalion conducted eleven out of sector patrols to Gonaives, Port de Paix, Liberte/Ferrier/Ouanaminthe, Saint Raphael/Don Don, Magasin, Le Borgne, two to Fort Liberte, Hinch, Capotilee, and Gros Morne.¹²

Base Camp Security

The base camp security mission required the company to conduct sustained operations for 24 hours a day, for seven days. The base camp security mission included the security of the base camp, the airfield, the fuel point and the camp entrance. The scope of the mission included occupation of ten guard positions, with a minimum of two soldiers per position.¹³ The platoons conducted the guard mission in six-hour shifts with six hours on and twelve hours off. The company noncommissioned officers planned and executed this mission. The platoon sergeant was the sergeant of the guard. They maintained communications with the guard towers at the company command tent. The squad leaders provided the direct supervision of the guards by moving between the guard towers and checking on the soldiers. One squad leader per platoon was responsible for the front gate. The team leaders were positioned around the perimeter at key locations that included the fuel point, the helicopter parking, and the interior entrance to the base camp. Appendix E shows a diagram of the base camp and the location of the guard towers.

Quick Reaction Force

One platoon assumed the responsibility as the quick reaction force for the battalion. This required the platoon to assume a 24-hour on-call mission for the battalion. The quick reaction force (QRF) consisted of one rifle platoon, a medical section, a combat engineer team, one psychological operations team, a field grade officer from the battalion,

and a battalion communications team. The QRF lived in a separate tent next to the battalion tactical operations center (TOC) within a few feet of their uploaded vehicles. The daily routine of the QRF consisted of group physical training, chow, rehearsals, and occasional readiness drills. The standard for the QRF to roll out the front gate was 10 minutes from alert to movement. The QRF was alerted five times during the battalion's time in Haiti.¹⁴

Weapons Buy Back Program

The weapons buy back program required the company to provide one officer and several soldiers for security. The intent of the program was to reduce or eliminate the number of weapons the Haitians possessed. The dates and times of the buy back were broadcast to the Haitians over the radio and by the psychological operations broadcasts in Cap Haitien. During the three months in Cap Haitien the battalion paid \$12,500 for nine M1 rifles, three M14 rifles, four shotguns, 19 pistols, and 32 CS hand grenades while in Haiti.¹⁵ The weapons were operational even though obvious recent operator maintenance was lacking on all the weapons. The success of the program is unknown since it was voluntary to participate in the program.

Presence Patrols

The battalion conducted 345 dismounted patrols and 242 mounted patrols while in Cap Haitien. The patrol size ranged from squad mounted patrols to platoon dismounted

patrols. The purpose of the patrols was to present a U.S. presence in Cap Haitien with the intent of deterring violence, promoting a stable environment for the people of Cap Haitien to go about living a normal life, and reassuring the people of Northern Haiti that they were secure.¹⁶

C Company conducted presence patrols in the U.S. sector of Cap Haitien during three week-long periods. Each time the company sub-divided the U.S. sector into patrol areas. The sectors enabled the company to ensure the entire U.S sector was patrolled within a 48-hour period. Additionally, the simple system of sub-dividing the sector gave the company the ability to vary the areas patrolled and enhanced the command and control of the while the squads and platoons were on patrol.

A typical day for a platoon during the patrolling week included a early breakfast, a morning patrol, followed by physical training, personal hygiene, a lunch break and preparation time for the afternoon patrol. Following the afternoon patrol the platoon eats dinner and prepares for the night patrol. Each patrol lasted between two and four hours. The start times of the patrols varied every day so no patrol ever started or ended the same time. With two platoons patrolling and one platoon on QRF, the company conducted a minimum of four daylight patrols and two night patrols every day.

A patrol matrix schedule was developed by 1LT Russo to complement the U.S. sector map of Cap Haitien. This simple tool enhanced the planning and execution of the patrols. Appendix F shows an example of a C Company patrol matrix for one week in Haiti.

Planning, preparation, debriefings, and after-action reviews were constant during the deployment. The mission was excellent for platoon leaders. This gave them a great opportunity to lead their platoons daily on missions where they were responsible. Most missions were conducted at platoon level that created an environment where the platoon leadership could excel. Each day the platoon and squad leaders planned the task, conducted rehearsals and inspections, executed the task, led the platoon debriefings to the battalion intelligence officer and then conducted after-action reviews. This battle rhythm began on day one and continued through the deployment. With the personality of C Company this fostered an atmosphere of constant improvement in how to conduct missions. Soldiers and leaders were directly involved in all phases and each sought ways of conducting the task better.

Rest and Relaxation

The battalion was fortunate enough to host several USO shows in the base camp, watch the Superbowl, and send most of the soldiers and leaders on some type of relaxation event. The USO performed on two occasions for the battalion.¹⁷ The first was a country music band who performed for the battalion task force in the rain for two hours. The lead singer stated during the performance that she could not believe that we were standing in the rain listening to them play. The reality was the battalion could not believe this band traveled all the way to Cap Haitien, Haiti to perform for them.

The battalion was able to send soldiers and leaders on one-day trips around the Cap Haitien area for a little rest and relaxation. These included fishing trips off the north Haiti coast, swimming and sunbathing at the Point Labadi resort, and tours of the Citadel.¹⁸ The brigade imposed a rule that soldiers could not consume fish caught within three miles of the coast. The soldiers participating in the fishing trips never indicated they caught any fish or suffered any health problems, therefore the rule was not hard to enforce. The rest and relaxation trips were important to get the soldiers and leaders away from conducting missions and their minds of the current tasks. These day trips had a tremendous impact on the morale of the soldiers.

Cemeteries, Wives, Voodoo, and Ulcers

Operation Uphold Democracy turned out to be a low threat mission for C Company contrary to expectations of the soldiers and leaders. The Haitians were not shooting at the company nor were there any riots or demonstrations in the streets of Cap Haitien. The conditions and threats the company trained for never materialized. This does not mean the mission was boring or that leadership challenges did not exist. In fact, the company leadership faced quite a few challenges in the few months it was deployed to include one platoon finding several dead bodies while on patrol, medically evacuating the company first sergeant, finding a voodoo site, and dealing with the challenge of having a soldier and his wife in Haiti at the same time.

Lieutenant Russo, the platoon leader of 1st Platoón was conducting a presence patrol in Area of Operation Saint Louis, on the outskirts of Cap Haitien. This was just one of many patrols C Company conducted in this part of Cap Haitien. Close to the end of the patrol route the platoon passed the local cemetery and observed several bodies stacked just inside the entrance to the cemetery. Regarding this as a less than normal occurrence the platoon reported the find to the commander by radio and cordon off the immediate area. The platoon observed about a dozen bodies each with a variety of injuries to their bodies. Once the report was forwarded to battalion and brigade the confusion and request for information began. The brigade headquarters began requesting a variety of detailed information about the number of bodies, the type of injuries, and details about the bodies such as approximate age, race, and sex. Answering this question required the platoon to possibly move the bodies for a more accurate report. In the meantime the brigade contacted the local police and the police monitors in Cap Haitien and reported the platoons find.¹⁹

The platoon reacted to finding the bodies based on a task they had prepared for during pre-deployment training. This included a task, conditions, and standards for a platoon when reacting to a dead body. The platoon did well by reacting quickly to cordon off and secure the area and reporting quickly. Unfortunately for them they had to wait for about three hours in the mid day heat with a dozen bodies while the local police and their monitors responded to the report. Additionally they had to endure a series of unfortunate requests for information from brigade that required them to examine the bodies were closer than anyone wanted to.

Just prior to the local police arriving, the local gravedigger arrived at the cemetery to bury the bodies. When the police arrived and questioning began it was determined that the bodies were brought to the cemetery by the local hospital. The bodies were Haitians whose families were unable to pay for burial or they had no families to take care of the bodies. Essentially, the bodies were brought to the cemetery for a pauper's burial.

A completely different challenge faced by the leadership in C Company were soldiers with military spouses in Haiti. Two soldiers in the company had wives that were assigned to the 25th Infantry Division and deployed to Haiti during the same time period as the company. In one case the soldier's wife worked in the division headquarters in Port au Prince. The other soldier's wife worked in 325 Forward Support Battalion as a truck driver. She was co-located at the Cap Haitien port with the brigade headquarters, about five miles from the battalion base camp. The C Company soldier whose wife was in the 325 FSB decided re-enlisted prior to the deployment. He previously indicating he was not going to re-enlist but changed his mind and re-enlisted based on the fact he knew his wife was deploying to Haiti and he wanted to go with her.

The question for the company chain of command was how to handle the husband and wife teams in country. The answer was easy for the soldier whose wife was in Port au Prince, since C Company rarely sent anyone to Port-au-Prince. In the three months in Haiti, they saw each other only twice for a few minutes each time. On the other hand the husband and wife team in Cap Haitien proved challenging. They were able to see each other several times a week and being newlyweds they were interested in being together as often as possible. The soldier's platoon sergeant, William McKeithan and the first

sergeant, Arthur LaRue counseled the soldier and his wife on displays of public affection and family planning. It was important that the soldier and his wife understood the problems of a pregnancy in Haiti, not only because the wife would have to return to Schofield Barracks but due to the risk to her and an unborn child given the environment the soldiers were living. The bottom line is the soldier and his wife were discreet, the chain of command was aware of the potential problems and the potential problems were addressed up front and no problems were experienced during the deployment.

Voodoo was something the company was briefed on prior to deploying to Haiti. The expectation that the company would encounter any type of voodoo was very low or non-existent. Most of C Company didn't really understand Voodoo. LT Powell the platoon leader of 2nd Platoon was conducting a presence patrol in AO St Louis.²⁰ During the conduct of the patrol the owners of a radio station informed him that a Voodoo ceremony site was found in an adjacent field. Upon further investigation he found three Voodoo symbols in the field. The radio station operators were nervous because they saw the site as a threat to them. They were in the process of purchasing the field that was adjacent to the land on which the radio station was located. Allegedly, another person claimed ownership of the land. Upon further investigation the platoon was unable to determine who had placed the Voodoo symbols in the field. Additionally, the specific ownership of the field could not be determined. The radio station did request additional U.S. presence and asked if the military could provide security to their property. This request was forwarded to brigade but declined. Presence patrols continued in AO St Louis where the radio station was located three times a day. Once every day the patrol

would stop and check in on the radio station. The Voodoo symbols consisted of a bag of blood tied to a stick that was upright in the ground. A circle of rocks surrounded the stick and the whole site had been burned. The Battalion S-2 (Intelligence Officer) took pictures of the site during the next patrol to AO St Louis. The company commander and his Haitian interpreter also went on the next patrol to the location to look at the site. The Haitian interpreter would not get out of the vehicle and refused to go near the Voodoo site or even look at the Voodoo site. SGT Spivey, a team leader in 2nd Platoon, escorted the commander to the site. After the commander looked at the three Voodoo sites, SGT Spivey proceeded to kick each of the sites over. When the commander returned to the vehicle the Haitian interpreter looked at the commander, shook his head and said "that Sergeant shouldn't have done that." When the commander asks why, the interpreter shook his head again and said, "he just shouldn't have done that." Upon return to the base camp, the commander asked the interpreter why he had said what he did the interpreter, who was much more relaxed, stated that to a Haitian Voodoo is a very powerful part of their everyday lives. Though he was Catholic, he very much believed in Voodoo. He indicated that there was good and bad Voodoo, and sometimes you could never quite tell the difference. He also stated that unless you believed in Voodoo that it "probably" would have no effect on you. Later the commander quizzed SGT Spivey and asked if he was worried about Voodoo. With a very serious look he indicated an emphatic "no."

Finding the Voodoo site did not seem to have an impact on the soldiers of C Company but stress did exist during the deployment. Leaders are affected by deployments as much, if not more than the soldiers are. Though there is an unknown element for all

involved in a deployment, leader responsibility increases as the size of the organization increases. The company first sergeant experienced the impact of increased stress of the deployment. Two weeks after arriving in Haiti the C Company NBC NCO, SGT Stanley woke the Company Commander around midnight with the startling news that First Sergeant LaRue was being medically evacuated. The First Sergeant had awakened several hours earlier with chest pains. He went to see the Battalion Surgeon located two tents over. After an initial examination the Battalion Surgeon decided to evacuate the First Sergeant to the field hospital located at Port au Prince. The Commander rode with the First Sergeant and the Battalion Surgeon to the airfield and the awaiting medical evacuation helicopter (MEDEVAC). Prior to departing the First Sergeant requested the company commander not inform his wife of his condition. Additionally he provided his recommendation on his temporary replacement and expressed concern over the company. Even while being evacuated his concern with the well being of the company outweighed his condition.

The First Sergeant was eventually evacuated from Port au Prince to Charleston S.C. for further tests and evaluations. Fortunately he did not have a heart problem, but was treated for ulcers and returned to the company two weeks later. The commander was unable to meet the request of the First Sergeant and did inform his wife. The company adjusted well to the departure of the one individual in the company who had the biggest influence on their lives. Sergeant First Class William McKithean, platoon sergeant for 1st Platoon, stepped forward and executed the duties of First Sergeant without missing a beat.

The former platoon leader, platoon sergeant team was now a company commander, first sergeant team.

On 4 March 1995 the Command of C Company changed from CPT Stanley to CPT Brian Reed. Upon completion of command the company departed for an out of sector mission to Grande Rivere-Du-Norde. The flexibility of the company to quickly adjust to a new commander during a major deployment is one of many examples of the superb soldiers and leaders in C Company. As the outgoing commander sat on the airfield awaiting a helicopter ride to Port-au-Prince, he watched the company depart for the out of sector mission with a mixture of pride and concern. C Company remained in Haiti for three additional weeks and conducted a relief in place with a UN Battalion from Pakistan. During C Company's short time in Haiti over 100 dismounted and mounted patrols were conducted, four out of sector missions were conducted, they rotated through three base camp security missions, participated in the weapons buy back program, and the battalions QRF. Of the 120 soldiers in C Company deployed to Haiti, no soldiers were injured and all returned to Schofield Barracks, Hawaii by 30 March 1995.

¹ Deployed Commanders Sitrep, 3rd BDE, Haiti MNF, 25 ID (L) TF Bronco – OPSUM Jan 95, 171200-181200 Jan 95. CARL Archives, Haiti Collection, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

² Department of the Army, Headquarters, 3rd BDE, 25th ID (L), MNF, Cap Haitien, Haiti, Brigade S3 Summary, 27 March 1995. CARL Archives, Haiti Collection, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

³ Deployed Commanders Sitrep, 3rd BDE, Haiti MNF, 25 ID (L) TF Bronco – OPSUM Jan 95, 201200-211200 Jan 95. CARL Archives, Haiti Collection, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

⁴ Operations Uphold Democracy, 4-87 IN History, April 1995. From the author's personal records.

⁵ Deployed Commanders Sitrep, 3rd BDE, Haiti MNF, 25 ID (L) TF Bronco – OPSUM Jan 95, 221200-231200 Jan 95. CARL Archives, Haiti Collection, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

⁶ Frago 3 (Anzio) to 4-87 IN OPORD 9503 (Uphold Democracy), Copy 12 of 14, Headquarters, TF 4-87 IN, Cap Haitien, Haiti, SDB17Jan95. CARL Archives, Haiti Collection, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

⁷ Deployed Commanders Sitrep, 3rd BDE, Haiti MNF, 25 ID (L) TF Bronco – OPSUM Feb 95, 141200-151200 Feb 95. CARL Archives, Haiti Collection, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

⁸ Frago 51 (KWA SID) to 4-87 IN OPORD 9503 (Uphold Democracy), Copy 12 of 14, Headquarters, TF 4-87 IN, Cap Haitien, Haiti, SDB17Jan95. CARL Archives, Haiti Collection, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

⁹ Department of the Army, Headquarters, 4-87 IN, Cap Haitien, Haiti, Operations KWA SID After Action Review, 17 February 1995. CARL Archives, Haiti Collection, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Deployed Commanders Sitrep, 3rd BDE, Haiti MNF, 25 ID (L) TF Bronco – OPSUM Feb 95, 141200-151200 Feb 95. CARL Archives, Haiti Collection, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

¹² 4-87 IN After Action Briefing Packet. March 1995. CARL Archives, Haiti Collection, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

¹³ Frago 34 (Airfield/Base Camp Security) to 4-87 IN OPORD 9503 (Uphold Democracy), Copy 12 of 14, Headquarters, TF 4-87 IN, Cap Haitien, Haiti, SDB17Jan95. CARL Archives, Haiti Collection, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

¹⁴ 4-87 IN After Action Briefing Packet. March 1995. CARL Archives, Haiti Collection, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Frago 48 (USO Tour) to 4-87 IN OPORD 9503 (Uphold Democracy), Copy 12 of 14, Headquarters, TF 4-87 IN, Cap Haitien, Haiti, SDB17Jan95. CARL Archives, Haiti Collection, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

¹⁸ 4-87 IN After Action Briefing Packet. March 1995. CARL Archives, Haiti Collection, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

¹⁹ Deployed Commanders Sitrep, 3rd BDE, Haiti MNF, 25 ID (L) TF Bronco – OPSUM Feb 95, 241200-251200 Feb 95. CARL Archives, Haiti Collection, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

²⁰ Ibid, 041200-051200 Feb 95.

CHAPTER 4

LESSONS LEARNED

C Company and 4-87 IN relied on the after action review (AAR) to identify lessons learned on all training events. Deployment to Haiti did not change the AAR practice. The requirement to continue identifying lessons learned and disseminating them quickly throughout the battalion occurred daily. All operations, from base camp security to the out of sector missions, ended with an AAR and dissemination of lessons learned. These AARs complemented the patrol debriefs to the battalion intelligence officer (S-2) and battalion S-5 by reviewing the operational impacts to the mission.

The after-action review is a detailed examination of an operation, training event, or activity to identify areas for sustainment or improvement. The AAR divides an event into what happened, why it happens, and recommendations on areas that need improvement. There are two types of AARs, formal and informal. A formal AAR is structured, organized by echelon or system, follows a format, and is focused on critical issues. Informal AARs are less structured and can be conducted by the unit leader or a soldier of the unit.

The AAR provides feedback, necessary to bring unit performance up to standard, by encouraging interaction and discussion of units strengths and weaknesses. Every AAR orients on a specific mission and/or system, identifies good and bad trends, and provides immediate feedback to the training unit. The AAR is not a critique, a class, or a briefing;

it is a professional discussion that requires active participation by all. Figure 7 provides and example of the format for an AAR.¹

AFTER ACTION REVIEW FORMAT	
A. Task/Condition/Standards for Mission/Task	
b. Commander's Plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none">(1) Higher's mission/concept(2) Unit mission/concept(3) Enemy situation(4) Commander's intent
c. OPFOR	<ul style="list-style-type: none">(1) OPFOR situation(2) OPFOR plan
d. What happened?	<ul style="list-style-type: none">(1) How mission unfolded(2) Key events(3) Results(4) Battle Damage Assessment(5) Weapon status
e. Key leader self assessment	
f. Discussion of 2-4 Key Issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none">(1) Select key issue which most effected outcome(2) Emphasis:<ul style="list-style-type: none">WHY it happenedHOW to do it better(3) Link planning/preparation/execution(4) Link soldier/leader/collective task
g. Review Each Battlefield Operating System (BOS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Each BOS should list +/- observation
h. Observations on Soldier/Leader Strengths/Weakness	
I. Summarize Standards and Key Lessons Learned	
J. Safety Issues and any Fratricide	

Figure 7. Joint Readiness Training Center, *Observer Controllers Handbook*, 3-1.

C Company arrived in Haiti as a learning unit. Unit leaders incorporated the AAR into all events to include morning physical fitness, a platoon live fire training exercise, or

during a weekly training meeting. The use of the AAR as a method to improve the unit easily carried over to operations in Haiti and enhanced the capabilities of the organization.

The lessons learned in this chapter are divided into four areas. They are pre-deployment training, deployment activities, operations in Haiti, and leadership lessons. Pre-deployment training focuses on areas of concentration or areas that needed more emphasis. Deployment looks at the challenges facing leaders deploying units. Operations in Haiti look at areas of special interest and specific problem areas. Leadership lessons address areas unique to the operation in Haiti and provide insight to the solutions used by the organization.

Predeployment Training

Pre-deployment training lessons include a variety of topics encompassing individual, leader, and collective skills. Each area describes what C Company did exceptionally well, did not train correctly, or areas that were not trained. Some topics are lessons that apply to Operations Uphold Democracy but most apply to all tactical units training for a deployment.

Some individual skills discussed are communications, driver training, and ROE and graduated response. Lessons involving leaders are leader training, conducting the leaders reconnaissance, and use of video teleconference. Collective skills include convoy operations, specific vignette training, and close quarters combat. Common to all is building confidence in soldiers, leaders, and as a unit.

One of the most important individual skills is the operation of the tactical satellite. The unit did not conduct a detailed tactical satellite (TACSAT) training for all radio telephone operators (RTOs). TACSAT training focused on familiarization and not the detailed operations. The company communication sergeant understood the intricacies of the system but during operations in Haiti was unable to participate in simultaneous operations requiring TACSAT operations. The company relied on RTOs as the subject matter experts on TACSAT operations. Intensive and detailed training prior to deployment is essential. Incorporation of the TACSAT into the training is vital to understand the capabilities and limitations of the system.

Training soldiers how to drive tactical vehicles is a very low priority in a light infantry battalion with only 36 vehicles. A rifle company only has one HUMMV and trailer. Driver training prior to deployment included licensing soldiers on operation of the HUMMV and five ton truck. The personnel strength of the battalion support platoon did not support the requirement to provide vehicle drivers for all the rifle companies during simultaneous operations. Each rifle company trained infantrymen on vehicle operations. The benefits allowed each platoon in the company to conduct operations with drivers from their platoons.

Incorporating the ROE and a graduated response in all training assisted in adjusting the mental readiness of the leaders and soldiers. Awareness of the constraints and limitations imposed by the ROE enabled the units to conduct operations without violating the ROE in Haiti. ROE and graduated response enhanced situational awareness and required leaders to think before they acted.

One of the many collective training tasks was personnel and vehicle search techniques. The attention spent developing and rehearsing the standard operating procedures (SOP) for searches benefited the unit in Haiti. This basic skill becomes a critical skill during checkpoint operations. The squads and platoons rehearsed this skill extensively prior to deployment and as a standard rehearsal prior to conducting checkpoint operations.

The company did not conduct sustained convoy training prior to deployment. Company leaders discussed convoy operations but did not train on this task and trained on operations of three to five vehicle-mounted patrols. The results were a steep learning curve for the company leadership in Haiti when conducting convoy operations. To an organization that does not have a habitual relationship with more than one vehicle at a time, planning and executing multiple vehicle convoys become a significant emotional event.

The company leadership addressed the task of reacting to finding a dead body during the vignette training by talking through the task. The company did not train on this as a collective task. The final STX did not incorporate this task into the scenario. The results were a lack of understanding of the total requirements of the platoons. Reporting procedures became a problem, specifically what information was required by higher headquarters and what to do once the area is secured. The first time to figure out the procedures is not when one or more bodies are found. Training prior to deployment is a must.

Close quarters combat marksmanship training provided a vehicle to establish a baseline for further collective training. This training built confidence in the soldiers and leaders by improving their marksmanship skills. Additionally it established a foundation to reinforce the ROE. The CQC training proved to be the favorite training event of the company during the pre-deployment training. Comments from the soldiers and junior leaders identified this as the most effective and useful training conducted.

The next step in the training process included the collective CQC (Blank and live) training at the live fire tire house. This training transferred the individual CQC marksmanship skills and the ROE training into collective training at the fire team and squad level. Squad and team leaders were able to refine the SOPs their units intended on conducting when working in a MOUT environment. This training proved beneficial in reinforcing teamwork and building confidence with the fire teams and squads. Additionally the restrictive conditions placed on each squad and fire team required the application of the ROE and use of the graduated response matrix. The situational awareness development in each soldier and leader increased their flexibility and agility to prepare them for the environment they were about to enter.

Worst case scenarios and conditions were established within each training event to encourage leaders and soldiers to think through what they would do. The idea was not to teach them what to think but how to think under various conditions. Previous training required small units to execute battle drills. These battle drills required the leaders and soldiers to think but conditions were straight forward in that killing the enemy was the endstate. Altering the conditions of the tasks and restricting the actions of the soldiers

required the ability to think quickly within an established process of the graduated response. Challenging scenarios and vignettes provide the catalyst for this type of training.

Insuring that leaders were trained by developing a multi-echelon training strategy focusing on the leader served the company well during the pre-deployment training. Leaders were able to learn and discuss the critical tasks prior to training their soldiers. With new procedures and standards for most of the tasks the ability to work out the company SOPs paid dividends during the training. Building on the foundation of basic close quarters marksmanship enabled the leaders to take soldiers confident in their individual skills apply them to the collective tasks. A structured multi-echelon approach to training, regardless of the time available, is needed to enhance the performance of the unit regardless of the task.

A leader reconnaissance of Haiti was conducted in November 1994. The participants included the battalion and brigade commander and the key individuals of the division staff. Restricting the participation in the leaders recon degraded the level of detail, situational awareness, and overall understanding of the environment in Haiti. Adding the company commanders, first sergeants, and the platoon leaders enhances the understanding of the leaders who conduct the daily operations. The majority of the missions conducted in Haiti were squad and platoon operations with occasional company missions. The leader recon did not include the key individuals who would plan, prepare, and conduct the pre-deployment training. Organizations must include the leaders involved

in the daily operations and training to participate in the leader reconnaissance of an operational area.

A video teleconference with the leadership of the 2-87 IN battalion proved very useful for the leadership of the battalion. Company commanders, first sergeants, platoon leaders and sergeants participated in the VTC. The ability to use this asset increased the situational awareness of the leadership. Unfortunately the VTC occurred after the pre-deployment training and some areas recommended by the leadership of 2-87 IN did not occur based on the limited remaining time prior to deployment. A VTC must be conducted prior to deployment if conducting a relief in place. The discussions provided insights to the operational environment, reduced the anxiety of not knowing what to expect, and enhanced coordination between units. Commanders should include as many unit leaders as possible in the VTCs. Team leaders can gain as much insight as a company or battalion commander can. Conduct the VTCs early in the planning process and continue during the execution of the pre-deployment training. Plan and prepare for the conduct of the VTC to enhance the outcome of this expensive but vital asset.

Building confidence in soldiers and leaders through live fire training, knowledge of the ROE, and their rehearsal of critical tasks enabled the company to deploy to Haiti mentally prepared to conduct operations within days of arrival. The ability to quickly conduct a relief in place and begin operations reflects the confidence of the unit in their pre-deployment training. Developing a positive and focused pre-deployment training plan enables the unit to prepare for operations.

In hindsight, the areas the company focused on during the pre-deployment were right on the mark. Addition of some tasks would have been helpful but removing a task would have hindered operations in Haiti. Identification of the critical tasks during the planning phase helped focus the training plan to achieve the brigade commanders desire endstate of confident leaders and soldiers who understood how to conduct the critical tasks with a restrictive ROE.

Deployment

Challenges face any unit when deploying to an operational area. These run the spectrum from the numbers of personnel deployed, types of equipment taken, family preparation, and many other areas. Most units include deployment as part of their mission essential task list (METL). The units train for this task by execution of the task. Prior training does not occur in the TRADOC schools for the leaders and units do not have time to “train” the task. Deployment then becomes a stressful event due to limited time, increased requirements, and lack of the general knowledge needed to deploy. Each deployment is unique and challenges change based on the type of unit deploying. The company faced a variety of challenges when preparing for deployment. These are identified along with a few recommendations.

Light Infantry battalions are limited in the number and types of vehicles. The battalion deployed with a vehicle package mixed with HUMMVs and the five ton truck. Five ton trucks provide a large hauling capacity but in the Haitian environment, where all

the streets are narrow in the city and the country roads are unimproved and narrow, the five ton does not have the agility to maneuver well in that environment. The HUMMV provided a versatile cargo and troop carrier. The ability to drive the HUMMV in the confines of the streets and roads of Haiti far outweighed its hauling capacity. The problems arose when the vehicles were overloaded with personnel and equipment for out of sector missions. Competing demands for the HUMMV reduced the number available for the out of sector missions requiring the company to increase and sometimes exceed the normal capacity of the vehicle. Leaders must balance mission requirements with safety when determining what and how much to carry. All leaders should conduct training on convoy operations, vehicle capabilities, organizational maintenance requirements, and vehicle load planning. Each area provides awareness to functions not normally associated with light infantry units. What is typically considered logistic functions, company executive officer functions, and battalion support platoon leader functions quickly become operational issues for light infantry company commanders and battalion staffs as they plan operations and assign tasks. During planning the incorporation of maintenance vehicles and details such as spare parts quickly becomes a command issue when spare parts, fuel, and tools conflicts with the need for an infantry squad.

Preparing a unit for deployment requires the company leadership not only to know the soldiers but their family strengths and weaknesses. Determining who stays and who goes becomes critical when troop ceilings are placed on the deploying unit. Most training revolves around the understanding that an organization deploys and operates at 100%. The reality when deploying to Haiti included ceilings on the number of soldiers deployed

and the type of weapon systems deployed. These restrictions challenge the organizational leader throughout the deployment phases. The company leadership can develop a personnel and equipment order of merit list early in the deployment process. Decrement lines then can be added to determine who and what does not deploy. The leaders recon, VTC, and a detailed mission analysis provide the information necessary to improve this planning process.

Part of preparing the company for deployment includes the determination of what will happen to the real property and organizational equipment not deployed. The issues of security, storage, and accountability must be the concern of the company commander. Identification of the company rear detachment commander (RDC) early in the deployment process eases the transition. Clearly articulated instructions, formal counseling, and periodic contact with the company RDC while deployed is essential to the success of the rear detachment and the redeployment. The RDC must be a very mature NCO who is self motivated, can work under minimal guidance, will take care of the company commanders property like it is his or her own, and maintain constant communication with the deployed unit. Enough emphasis cannot be placed on the correct decision on who to assign as the RDC.

Operations In Haiti

Operations in Haiti did not end when the platoon or company returned from a patrol or completed a security mission. Sustained operations included physical fitness,

training, hygiene, morale and welfare, and the preparation and conduct of daily operations. Every event a leader plans for the unit must be well thought out, planned, and include the ability to adjust. Sustained operations for most units mean deploying to the field on Monday and returning seven to ten days later or deploying for several weeks to a combat training center. Sustained operations are tough and require leaders who care about the soldiers while maintaining discipline and readiness.

Physical fitness, personal hygiene, and a rest plan are three important areas in sustainment operations. The three are tied together when considering sustainment operations. A physical fitness plan sustains the ability of the soldier to conduct daily missions, reduces stress, and maintains unit cohesion. The execution of a fitness plan needs to occur at the lowest organizational level to enhance flexibility in the daily operations and the fitness plan. Personal hygiene is important to maintain the health of the individual soldier and reduce the spread of disease. Facilities, time, and procedures must be in place to accommodate a good hygiene plan. It is incumbent on leaders to monitor the hygiene of the soldiers. Consideration of a rest plan is essential when planning operations at the organizational level. Junior leaders implement the rest plan based on their current operation. The company must conduct a time analysis to determine time available for rest of the unit. Leaders enforce the plan for their organization. All leaders monitor the organization and make adjustment to ensure all members receive sufficient rest. The company used the rule of thumb that each individual needed about five to eight hours of rest per 24 hours. The company leadership can include these considerations during pre-deployment leader training and incorporate them during the deployment.

Sustainment training is also important during the operation. A training plan that sustains the skills developed during pre-deployment is important during the operation to maintain a proficiency level in the individual, reinforce basic skills, and re-educated the organization on reasons for the operation. The areas the company concentrated on during the deployment were the squad and platoon battle drills, ROE and graduated response, and CQC marksmanship. The methods used were rehearsals, leader training, dry-fire CQC drills, and collective training. The benefits from training mitigated the length of deployment and reminded the individuals and the unit of the combat their mission.

Each deployment is different and Haiti included a variety of operational lessons learned. The lessons learned are specific to the North Haiti area of operation and to C Company but can apply to light infantry units in stability and support operation. The areas listed can be used as a grab bag of techniques available to the small unit leader.

One technique the battalion and company used successfully was the backbrief of all tasks. Everyone gets tired, especially leaders, and between stress, high OPTEMPO, lack of sleep, and different interpretations of the task at hand communications between individuals typically are misinterpreted. The expectation in the battalion and company was a backbrief immediately upon completion of the receipt of a task. Regardless of the complexity of the instructions a backbrief enabled a leader to determine if the subordinate understood the mission and clarify any problem areas. All organizations should use this technique in garrison, in the field, or deployed.

The QRF needed to be prepared to conduct operations 24 hours a day, seven days a week for extended amounts of time. The planning and preparation of the QRF for

extended operations (12 hours +) enabled the battalion the flexibility to use the QRF in an opened ended timeframe mission. The QRF understood the requirement to prepare all equipment for extended operations to include night operations. Remembering the Rangers need for night vision devices in Somalia increased the attention to detail and the requirement to be mentally prepared for any contingency.

Every patrol the company executed ended with a centralized patrol debrief facilitated by a representative from the battalion S-2 section. All members of the patrol were present and feedback from all members of the patrol was necessary for the input into the debrief. The debriefs were beneficial in identifying trends and disseminating critical information found by the patrol. Typically, the platoons used the time immediately following the debrief for a platoon AAR. Units should conduct mission debrief training during the pre-deployment training to make everyone aware of the requirement, enhance awareness of what the debrief is looking for, and develop a battle rhythm.

C Company deployed to Haiti with a heightened awareness of individual weapons orientation, discipline to reduce accidental discharges, and weapons safety. The battalion established a requirement to conduct skill level one weapons clearing procedures for all personnel in the battalion on the individual weapon carried by that soldier. The drill was reinforced constantly by the chain of command and became a standard operating procedure of the battalion. The results of the emphasis on weapons safety eliminated accidental discharges by members of the battalion. Only two accidental discharges occurred and they were by soldiers of other units entering and exiting the camps. All leaders and units must train and maintain weapons safety procedures in their units.

Accidental discharges in training or during operations are an indicator of the risks associated with units carrying weapons and live ammunition. It is incumbent on the leaders to establish realistic procedures, train soldiers, and increase situational awareness to mitigate the inherent risks involved when operating with loaded weapons. This is a leader responsibility to reduce the risk.

The battalion varied the mission schedule within the company and battalion. Rotating companies weekly on different tasks added variety to the schedule, distributed the mission load, and reduced complacency. Platoon missions rotated within the company for the same reasons. During the Cap Haitien patrolling week the company rotated the platoon sectors, varied the times of the patrols, and made deliberate changes to the patterns of the patrol. All techniques contributed to increase overall morale. All the missions were tough based on the requirement for sustained operations, but these were mitigated based on the rotation schedule. Leaders must consider the impacts of sustained operations on their organizations and work on methods to mitigate the negative impacts.

Basic soldier skills and discipline are reflected several ways in a unit. A common area light infantry unit's overlook is primary maintenance, checks and services of vehicles and equipment. In a garrison environment weapons, vehicles, and equipment are stored in the arms room, motorpool, or platoon lockers the majority of the time. Once a piece of equipment is cleaned and serviced it remains in that condition until the next training event. This could be one day or three months depending on the equipment. During a deployment maintenance of weapons, vehicles, and equipment becomes a daily requirement to sustain the operational capability of the equipment. This is one area where all leaders must take

the lead in establishing simple procedures and checks to ensure continuous maintenance is done by everyone. Each platoon can identify an armorer and a vehicle subject-matter-expert. The company identifies a maintenance officer and that officer conducts the administrative maintenance functions to assist the company executive officer. Conduct sustainment training on maintenance of during the deployment. This can be done at the smallest unit level by the chain of command. Don't forget to plan this on the training schedule.

A patrolling technique unique to presence patrols in an environment where presence and deterrence of violence is an objective is the use of flashlights in lieu of night vision goggles. In a built up area and in country villages flashlights enable patrols to observe down narrow alleys, into shadowed doorways, and into areas where there is no ambient light. Additionally, the flashlight is useful when conducting inspections of vehicles at night during checkpoint operations. The flashlight is used selectively by a designated flashlight carrier. As with all techniques, rehearsals and SOPs establish when, how, and who uses the flashlight. Units should consider this and other specialized equipment during mission analysis and purchase enough for about one per fire team.

Medical evacuation planning continues to be important during operations similar to Haiti. Plan and confirm landing zones and pickup zones for medical evacuation prior to mission execution. All units conducting patrols should know LZ locations within the local area. The company did not develop a series of LZs in the Cap Haitien area. Fortunately they were not needed, but reducing the requirement of a leader to locate a LZ after a casualty occurs increases the leaders ability to medically evacuate casualties.

The tactical satellite (TACSAT) provided the company with a reliable method of long range communication while conducting out of sector missions. The company planned and carried AM tactical radio as a redundant means of communications. Each radio requires the unit to stop and establish a communication link with higher headquarters. During extended missions covering large areas, planned communication stops and pre-determined communication transmission sites must be established. This requires the leader to plan for the best locations for communications as part of the operation.

Linguists and loud speaker teams are unique systems a light infantry company typically does not incorporate in training. Linguists provide the unit the ability to communicate with the indigenous population. Problems occur when interpretation is not clear and the leader is unsure of the message conveyed to the locals. An alternate method of checking an interpreter's ability is the use of the Special Forces Operations Detachment A area language experts. Routinely the SF teams working with the battalion provided feedback on the interpreter's performance and abilities. Leaders should conduct periodic checks of linguist by an outside source.

Maneuver damage of civilian property is not something light infantry units consider during training. In Haiti damage to privately owned property occurred on several occasions. The unit was unprepared to deal with the administrative requirement necessary to compensate the property owner. The unit reacted by sending a representative back to the area to settle all the administrative and legal requirements. Each company must train and prepare a claims officer prior to deployment. Plan for maneuver damage as a

contingency and how the unit deals with civilians in the event of damage caused by the unit.

Pre-combat checks and inspections are a requirement for all operations. Simple checklists and procedures enable leaders and soldiers to conduct this routine task without becoming complacent or overlooking critical equipment. Post-combat checks and inspections are necessary to ensure accountability of equipment and ammunition. Leaders can establish simple procedures to ensure all pre and post checks are complete. This routine becomes monotonous and to a point ridiculous, but the self-discipline required to do routine business enables the unit to always be prepared for contingencies.

The battalion provided video cameras and still cameras for recording events during all out of sector missions and some presence patrol missions. The video camera enabled the company to record the areas of operation during leader reconnaissance and for feedback during AARs. The video enabled the company commander to show the area of operation observed during the leader reconnaissance. Watching video of operations conducted provided excellent feedback for leaders to adjust techniques used during presence patrols, security mission, and checkpoint operations. Video can provide a legal backup to organizations when faced with situations with questionable outcome. Units should purchase video cameras, train operators, and plan for their use during operations and as a leader reconnaissance tool.

Every presence patrol consisted of a mounted and dismounted phase. The mounted patrol enables the platoon or squad to move quickly into an area or cover a large area and be seen by the local population. Dismounted patrols enable the platoons and

squads to get a detailed view of the area of operation. The ability to interact with the local population increases soldier situational awareness, offers feedback from the population, and increase the local population's confidence in the security of the area. All patrols must consist of mounted and dismounted phases.

The battalion determined the need for slingload kits for vehicles on all out of sector missions. During a B Company OOSM a vehicle became disabled following an accident and was unable to return to Cap Haitien under its own power. The battalion extracted the vehicle by helicopter slingload. Including the slingload kits and training the operators and leaders how to use them increases the flexibility of the unit when accidents occur.

Most units do not train with psychological operations teams. Leaders and units may see these teams during JRTC rotations but find it difficult to incorporate them in all unit operations. The PSYOP teams became a focus for the platoon and company during operations in Haiti. In Cap Haitien, the PSYOP teams conducted daily broadcasts throughout the city. During OOSM, the PSYOP teams broadcast messages from the Aristide government and was the focus of a visit to a town by the company. Leaders need to understand what message is being broadcast, consider the impact of the message on the local population, and determine actions or counter actions based on the feedback from the local population. In stability and support operations the broadcasts by the PSYOP teams are typically the center of gravity for the small unit. Leaders must plan operations around the employment of the PSYOP teams. Location of the PSYOP team, security measures, and combat service support requirements are a few areas of concern. At a minimum

leader training focusing on the planning considerations and employment of PSYOP teams should be included during the pre-deployment training. C Company did not do this prior to deployment and had to develop techniques for employment once in Haiti.

Attack aviation assets were employed during some OOSM. The purpose was a show of force and the use of an air platform for reconnaissance. The aviation was planned and used in close conjunction with the infantry platoons each night during OOSMs. Though the use of aviation was well planned and executed, the use at night over a village where everyone was asleep can cause the effect of upsetting the local population. Consider using aviation assets during daylight hours to increase the impact of their use on the local population. Most locals are out during the day and can see the aircraft. If aviation is used at night, keep the aircraft from flying inside the city limits as best as possible to reduce the disturbance to the local population.

The companies in the battalion used the area assessment to gather information on the specific area of operation. The information was passed along to brigade and division for analysis. This became a measuring tool for determining the success of a secure and stable environment. The platoons used area assessment checklists to gather information from a variety of locals in a town. Typically, platoons would talk to schoolteachers, several shop owners in the market, religious representatives, local officials, and some people on the streets. Leaders should plan on the type of people they will question while conducting an area assessment. The S-2, Civilian Affairs, and Special Forces folks can provide insight on the type of people to seek out and gather information. This is a task most leaders were not accustomed to, but enjoyed the most since they were able to engage

in conversation with the locals. The individual collecting the information should not be the patrol leader, he is responsible for the patrol. The civil affairs representative or a designated member of the platoon should talk to the locals. Discussions should occur inside the security umbrella of the patrol, and the soldier asking questions should be unarmed or have his weapon slung in a nonthreatening position. The company must conduct this as part of the pre-deployment training and rehearse everyone in the patrol prior to execution. The trick is for the patrol to be able to secure itself, gather the required information, project strength, and give the impression of a non-threatening organization. This may seem contradictory but a dual message must be sent by the patrol that we are a disciplined unit that cannot be intimidated and everything is "okay" because this patrol is in the area to maintain security. The first message is sent to any individual or organization that is a threat. The second message is sent to the remainder of the population who is trying to understand why American soldiers are in their town, carrying weapons, and asking questions. This is the toughest part of a presence patrol. Focused training, leader discussions, and explanations to soldiers on the importance of these types of patrols are important to success.

Like presence patrols and out of sector missions base camp operations produced some lesson. The base camp the battalion occupied required a platoon to secure it at all times. Security measures were evaluated during the relief in place and the number of guard posts were reduced based on the ability to cover the base camp perimeter with observation enhanced by lights at night. In some areas the wire obstacle was moved farther out from the perimeter. The mission analysis determined the threat was low and no

platoon or company defensive positions were identified around the perimeter. The QRF had the mission to reinforce or react to any threats to the base camp. During the company's deployment to Haiti, there were no attempts at intrusion to the base camp. Leaders must conduct a detailed mission analysis of the base camp security and balance the requirement for security with the threat to the base camp. A re-evaluation of the threat level and security of the base camp, as part of an on-going mission analysis, is needed to determine if adjustments to the security measures are necessary. A combination of floodlights, patrol dogs, stationary and roving guards can provide sufficient security in low threat areas such as the Haiti environment.

Leadership Lessons Learned

Leadership challenges face any organization regardless of the environment. The company faced a few challenges while deployed to Haiti. The company and battalion leaders remained cognizant that problem areas had to be identified and dealt with quickly. The missions in Haiti were primarily platoon and squad missions. The company commander and first sergeant spent the majority of their time planning and coordinating missions and dealing with the leadership challenges of the company.

To maintain morale and assist in the reduction of stress the battalion provided the soldiers with the opportunity to participate in several morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) activities while in Haiti. These included tours to the Citadel a historic fortress in Northern Haiti, deep-sea fishing trips, and day trips to a resort beach at Point Labadi.

Additionally the battalion rotated televisions, videocassette recorders, and videotapes among the companies to use during down time. Armed Forces Radio deployed a mobile radio/TV station to Northern Haiti and it was located in the base camp. The radio station played a variety of music and broadcast Armed Forces News on the TV.

The battalion allowed soldiers the use of e-mail and video teleconferences (VTC) to talk back to their families at home station. These were available at no cost to the soldiers as a way to stay in touch with their family. Units should establish a plan to use the e-mail and VTC capabilities available to maintain moral and enable soldiers to stay in touch with families.

Leaders and their organization must be prepared to deal with the growing number of husband and wife soldier teams. With the increases in these soldier teams comes the challenges of having them to deploy to the same theater of operation, possibly in the same base camp, or have children under the care of a guardian or family member back at home station. The unit leadership must consider what the policy is for a soldier family team and what the plan is for their interaction. The basis for any plan dealing with this issue revolves around respect for the soldier family, dignity in dealing with them, and discretion in their behavior. Leaders must counsel the soldiers, especially the young soldiers, and help them develop a plan for spending time with each other. Simply telling a soldier family team not to spend time alone is an example of a leader who is not accepting responsibility for the challenge and setting the soldier family team up of failure.

Information and communication become critical during sustained operations. The organization must develop tools for dissemination of information. Rumor control is a

leader responsibility and must begin before deployment and continue throughout an operation. Techniques available to the leader are daily briefs to each level of the organization, future planning that incorporates all levels of the chain of command, sharing of information with adjacent units, use of radio command messages (if AFR is available), and hands on leadership. Rumors spread quickly in small organizations and can be destructive. Constant attention to rumor control and dissemination of information must be applied by all leaders. The battalion used a daily back brief to the commander to disseminate and share information. C Company in turn used a similar technique to pass information along to the platoons and soldiers.

Leadership challenges faced in Haiti were no different than those faced by leaders in other units deployed to other areas of operations. Unit leadership must be aware of their unit's problems and provide creative methods of quickly fixing them. From the day of deployment notification through re-deployment the biggest challenge leaders face are helping soldiers with problems. Through creative thinking, caring, and respect can each problem be solved.

Conclusion

The lessons learned described in this chapter are a snap shot of one company's experiences in Haiti. Each unit and leader deployed have the responsibility of quickly identifying problem areas and fixing them. No deployment will ever be perfect but the organization that learns from its mistakes and fixes them become high performance

organizations. The type of learning environment the leaders establish before the deployment that continues during a deploy enables good organizations to succeed during sustained operations. C Company did not do everything perfect but the leaders worked hard to maintain a good information flow, train the soldiers in the skills identified during the mission analysis, and sustain the morale of soldiers while in Haiti.

¹ Department of the Army, Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command. *Joint Readiness Training Center Observer Controller Handbook*, Edition 6, Fort Polk, LA., p. 3-1.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Days of the all-purpose doctrinal threat template are gone just as the days of a single-prescription Army doctrine are gone.

TRADOC Pam 525-5, Force XXI Operations, August 1, 1994, p.2-10.

Training tactical units for combat is a complex task requiring dynamic leadership and disciplined soldiers. Instilling a warrior spirit in soldiers to act aggressively and violently while closing with and destroying an enemy takes a focused and a time proven training plan. All soldiers and leaders are inculcated from the time of entering the Army with a mentality to destroy the enemy. Other tasks are required as a member of the Army but killing the enemy is the basis for all actions. In contrast, the warrior mind-set so essential for combat operations can be the source of anger, confusion, frustration and failure when applied unmodified to OOTW.¹

Preparing tactical units for the realities of military operations other than war also requires dynamic leadership and disciplined soldiers. In a 1994 report the Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General (IG) stated that well-trained, disciplined forces are a fundamental prerequisite for conducting successful peace operations.² Removing or tempering a soldier trained response to act aggressively and violently is a challenge facing leaders of tactical units today. Changing behavior patterns instilled by deliberate and focused training requires innovations in training, flexible soldiers, and time. Training is needed to hone tangible skills and to adjust "attitude." The DOD IG also indicated that attitude, which cannot be changed overnight, is considered the most important aspect

affecting performance.³ Dr. Yates of the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) warns that combat unit commanders should recognize that a conventional mind-set or warrior mentality may be highly inappropriate, even counter productive, to the task at hand and may need to be tailored for nontraditional operations.⁴

This paper reviewed one unit's ability to successfully prepare and conduct a military operation other than war. C Company, 4-87 IN is an example of a typical US Army tactical unit. Leaders, soldiers, the training program, and operation tempo (OPTEMPO) were similar to most other tactical units in the US Army. The reasons for the units' success can be transferred to other units in the military to apply in the future.

Uphold Democracy and the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) were considered a success by David Bently of the Institute for Strategic Studies because of adequate preparation time, unity of support and effort, and a clear mission with a finite endpoint.⁵ C Company contributed to this success by applying available doctrine for MOOTW to its training plan within the US Army's training model.⁶ The training plan used by C Company focused on critical tasks, made maximum use of the limited time available, and applied a brigade commanders vision of how the unit should prepare for Haiti.

C Company's Haiti story provides one example that the US Army can prepare tactical units for the realities of MOOTW. There are many challenges that face organizations as they prepare for MOOTW, training resources, time available, information on the situation, changing the mental focus of a unit, and personnel problems just to name a few. C Company faced all of these challenges. Overcoming these challenges in C Company was no different than the tasks other tactical units face everyday in training,

MOOTW, or combat. In this case a good mission analysis by the brigade commander, a focused training plan, time available to train, and smart leaders and soldiers in the unit were the keys to success for C Company. MG George Fisher, the commander of 25th Infantry Division (Light) during Uphold Democracy described the preparation for Haiti by pointing out, "We had done a lot of operations other than war training as part of our normal conventional training. Things like civilian refugees, non-governmental organizations, the media, host nation forces, and local government officials. So, we were used to dealing with operations other than war challenges. All we needed to do was the situational training and rules of engagement training. By that time we were able to build into the training the street smarts that was a result of the on ground reconnaissance. Of the twenty vignettes that we built for this mission, we ended up having to execute all but one about a 95 percent solution."⁷

In December 1994 the US Army FM 100-5 *Operations*, addressed MOOTW.⁸ Since then the evolution of Army doctrine addressing MOOTW has expanded to include FM 100-23 *Peace Operations*. Additionally, MOOTW training support packages are available to units through the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and the USAIC at Fort Benning, GA. Doctrinal information and tactics, techniques, and procedures are available to prepare tactical units for MOOTW. The doctrinal focus for the Army is still proficiency in warfighting tasks.⁹ C Company successfully tailored the available resources during planning and applied them during the pre-deployment training. MG Fisher believes the training strategy was about right. The focus was always on "the blocking and tackling," which produced good units and good troops, and then integrated the operations

other than war tasks around the edges so that everyone is comfortable with doing those kinds of missions."¹⁰

BG Lawson Magruder identified five specific topics that should be integrated into home station for professional development for peace enforcement, during his 1993 address at the Light Infantry Conference. Ensure all officers and NCOs read and study the doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures for peace ops. Learn more about the organizations that will be found on the battlefield during MOOTW such as private organizations, non-governmental organizations, and governmental organizations. Be prepared to conduct STXs on short notice at squad and platoon level that replicate potential situations under restrictive rules of engagement. Expose leaders to the arena of negotiations. Continue working on media relations in units.¹¹

The Army has adopted a training methodology to prepare units for MOOTW that is about six months long. It includes individual requirements training (IRT), theater specific situational training exercises conducted at the small unit level, and culminates with a mission rehearsal exercise (MRE) for the brigade combat team (BCT). The IRT is a series individual tasks that are theater specific. Some of these tasks are conducting a media interview, reacting to a minefield, and negotiation techniques. Units conduct their IRT as part of homestation pre-deployment training. Individual replacements deploying to Bosnia conduct IRT at Fort Benning GA or at the CMTC in Germany. The STX is a series of critical collective tasks a unit trains for at homestation. A few of these tasks are checkpoint operations, presence patrols, fixed site security, and weapons storage site inspections. The unit as part of pre-deployment training at the units' homestation

conducts the STX. The MRE is a seven to ten day battalion or brigade level exercise conducted at JRTC or CMTC. The MRE places the unit in a scenario replicating the area of operation within the theater. The scenario includes all IRT tasks and STX tasks. The purpose is to rehearse the organization as a whole prior to deployment.¹² Training for peacekeeping is little different from training for any unique or demanding environment. The Army has long recognized the need to structure and conduct training which simulates the unique demands of a particular region, theater or level of lethality.¹³ "Specific-to mission" training prepares units for peacekeeping duties in the Sinai Desert. This pre-deployment training begins three months prior to deployment. Tactical units have participated in the Sinai Peacekeeping mission since 1982.¹⁴

The current training methodology is preparing units for the realities of MOOTW. The training transitions a unit from its wartime mission essential task list and prepares the unit for MOOTW. To date the 1st Armored Division, the 1st Infantry Division, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 1st Cavalry Division, and the 10th Mountain Division used this methodology to prepare for operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This training approach focuses a unit on critical tasks over a period of time to prepare for MOOTW. The units have time to train on a variety of new tasks and adjust the conditions for MOOTW on existing tasks. The STX and MRE scenarios expose the leaders and soldiers to the expected conditions of Bosnia. The extended training period enables units to ease into the role of peacekeeper and adjust the aggressive mentality of a warrior. Colonel's Wood and Abizaid stated in a 1994 Special warfare Magazine article that; "well trained and disciplined forces are the start point for peacekeeping training." Additionally, they

observed that it is necessary to, “provide training that allows soldiers and leaders to adjust their mindset from combat to peacekeeping.¹⁵ Officers from Great Britain, France, Argentina, and Spain all concluded that well trained units, soldiers confident in their leaders, specific theater training, and training that allows soldiers to adopt the “right” attitude for peacekeeping are essential for preparing units for Peacekeeping operations.¹⁶

What can be done to improve on the training successes and what mitigating factors are necessary to reduce failures? There are seven areas the US Army needs improvement. The first is dissemination of lessons learned. The Army has the organizations available to collect the lessons learned from MOOTW.¹⁷ Gathering the lessons is not the problem but dissemination is slow. Professional articles and CALL Updates help disseminate tactics, techniques, and procedures. Analysis and feedback, transfer of lessons learned into POIs at TRADOC schools, and incorporation into doctrine are slow. The time gap between gathering lessons to changes in doctrine and TRADOC instruction must increase.

Second, there must be increased emphasis on doctrine in TRADOC schools, tactical units, and key leaders to instill a common understanding of the MOOTW environment to and organization. This shared understanding of doctrine increases the understanding of why an operation is being conducted. Peacekeeping is less a specific type of military mission and more an operation conducted in a unique environment. It is an environment, just like mountain, jungle or desert, that a leader must understand and train for. Wood and Abizaid state, “This environment can be characterized as austere, disordered, dangerous, extremely close to local populations, and politically charged. Most difficult for many military professionals is the concept that there are often no clearly

defined enemies for the peacekeeping force.¹⁸ One well-decorated WWII and Korean War vet speaking to LTG Zinni at a Retired Officers Association in Southern California stated, “You live in a far more complex world than I did. Ours may have been greater and more vast in the combat and conflict but is was much simpler in understanding who the bad guy was and what we had to do and the job we had to get done.” LTG Zinni goes on to say, “You no longer can be only the pure military thinker and just worry about fires and maneuver. Fires and maneuver are just two relatively simple battlefield activities that underlie a vast ever-increasing number of other battlefield activities.”¹⁹

Third, unit leaders must focus on four areas in training. Discipline, the critical theater tasks, rules of engagement with a graduated response, teamwork, and confidence. These four areas enable an organization to quickly adjust to any situation it may encounter during a MOOTW. Brigadier Michael Harbottle, described the importance of the individual soldier in peacekeeping by stating, “There is no doubt in my mind, that the success of a peacekeeping operation depends more than anything else on the vigilance and mental alertness of the most junior soldier and his non-commissioned leader, for it is on their reaction and immediate response that the success of the operation rests.”²⁰ Wood and Abizaid emphasize, “the rules of engagement will detail when to use deadly force, but the majority of confrontations a soldier will encounter will require using a lesser degree of force.” Additionally, “the ability of soldiers to hit targets quickly and accurately is closely tied to the need of commanders to employ minimum force to achieve success.” Finally they state, “soldiers will face difficult choices in the event they must used their personal weapons. Therefore soldiers must be trained to think before they shoot.”²¹ The officers

from, Spain, Argentina, Great Britain, France all agree that discipline, cohesive units that understand the ROE and are trained on theater specific tasks are prepared for MOOTW.²²

Fourth, develop and enhance flexibility in leaders and soldiers. This flexibility allows and organization to adjust to events as they occur. Flexibility requires situational awareness of an individual and the ability to anticipate events. The goal is a unit that maintains the initiative and is not reactive to events. Leaders must respond to incidents with less firepower and more mental flexibility than normally required on the conventional battlefield.²³ A United States State Department report recommended that peacekeeping operations must remain flexible in defining objectives as the situation changes, focusing on key events such as elections. The report also emphasized that peacekeeping personnel must be professional, high-quality people who are natural improvisers, capable of seizing authority.²⁴ LTG Zinni suggests training that, "encourages innovation and a non-traditional way of dealing with situations.²⁵

Dr. Yates reinforces this by explaining that, "all officers (especially those in combat arms) should deploy with a mind-set at odds with much of what they have been taught about war. They should be prepared to see many traditional assumptions about their profession violated. They should not expect clear guidance while the situation is fluid and learn to live with ambiguity. Do not expect to operate in a political vacuum and do not expect to be in a black and white morality play pitted against an easily identifiable enemy located across a clearly demarcated line. They should expect changing and additional missions and tasks but should not expect to be allowed to use every means at their disposal to carry out those missions. They should expect to be called on to

demonstrate restraint, together with a keen sensitivity to political considerations and to alien cultures, either or both of which they might find repugnant or unintelligible. They should expect ambiguity, fluidity, constraints, dejection, frustration, and the unknown-in short, they should expect the worst. If these expectations are not realized, they will be pleasantly surprised. If the worst does occur, officers and soldiers will be better prepared to deal with the situation.²⁶

In an article to the magazine *Parameter*, Major General Arnold stated, "Leaders must remain flexible if they are to find solutions to the planning uncertainties that will inevitably arise during execution of the operation."²⁷ He goes on with encouragement to say, "...nor have our soldiers lost the knack for improvising and for transferring knowledge and skills to tasks other than those for which they were specifically trained."²⁸

Wood and Abizaid also observed that an "understanding of the environment requires training units to have situational awareness at the squad, platoon, and company levels. This is important if commanders hope to succeed in understanding and controlling their sectors of the peacekeeping battlefield."²⁹

Fifth, units should not focus too closely on exactly how to execute a task. Given that each task has a condition and standard, to maintain flexibility requires a unit to have procedures to execute certain tasks but also an understanding that the task will occur under a wide variety of conditions each time. This ties in with developing smart soldiers by teaching them how to think through a problem and be able to influence the outcome in the favor of the unit. Wood and Abizaid note, "many tactical techniques used by units in peacekeeping are fairly simple, easily trained and suited to a "battle drill" approach.



C COMPANY CONDUCTED CLOSE QUARTERS COMBAT UNDER VARIOUS CONDITIONS IN THE LIVE FIRE TIRE HOUSE AT SCHOFIELD BARRACKS ,HI DURING PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING.

Figure 8. Photo by Author

(patrolling, checkpoints, observation posts, convoy escorts, and area security). Squads and platoons perform the majority of peacekeeping tasks, and the training of these units falls comfortably within the capabilities of the battalion and company. There is no standard peacekeeping mission. Each operation is conducted in a unique setting with its own political, geographic, economic and military characteristics.”³⁰ MG Arnold reinforces with an observation of soldiers in Somalia by stating, “soldiers who were well trained and ready to take the initiative, while acting with compassion and restraint, ensured that each mission was accomplished.”³¹

Sixth, units can develop an economy of scale while training on their wartime tasks by altering the conditions of the tasks that reflect conditions found in MOOTW. During

training units can face civilians on the battlefield, media, unforeseen events, or unexpected changes in orders. Training under a wide variety of conditions develops the flexibility of the unit and forces soldiers and leaders to think. Too often a unit conducts a task under the same conditions because it is comfortable and "the way it has always been done." This breeds complacency and stifles initiative and flexibility. Prior to Uphold Democracy, C Company included a variety of changing conditions while training for its wartime tasks.³² The necessary changes can be taught as refinements to operations, expansion of basic skills and enhancement of fundamental procedures in a relatively short period before deployment. Additionally leaders should structure training to stress junior leaders.³³ The results are leaders who are comfortable with change and are not shaken by the unexpected.

Finally, leaders must beware of the trap of training only for MOOTW and forgetting their wartime tasks. The tactical unit must always be prepared for a fight whether the condition is war or MOOTW. A boxer prepares for a fight in the ring with his opponent because he is expecting his opponent to fight back. If he is at a wedding reception he is not expecting a fight but if a belligerent guest takes a swing at him, the boxer, he is still prepared to fight and win. Likewise the warrior must be prepared to quickly adjust from war to MOOTW and back. Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the spectrum of the tasks a soldier faces. The DOD IG reported, "where new skills are required they are a minor part of the overall unit or individual competence likely to be necessary."³⁴ Dr. Yates warns, "staff officers planning combat operations should not ignore OOTW aspects of their overall mission just as OOTW planners cannot afford to

ignore possible combat operations." He goes on to point out that, "combat troops should be prepared for a variety of noncombat tasks they will inevitably be called on to perform in OOTW. Whether they should train for these tasks is a controversial point, but efficiency dictates that they should at least be briefed about adjustments they may have to make."³⁵




FIGURE 5-1

Figure 9. Special Military Training For Peace Operations, Program Evaluation." Inspector General Department of Defense, 11.

The DOD IG report accurately noted that, "single minded commitment and combat focus are essential to individual initiative and battlefield victory. In contrast, a peace operation is normally a dispassionate effort to stop or prevent battle and bloodshed. It is not a crusade. Victory and defeat are irrelevant, and success is never certain. The goal offers less clarity and more shades of gray. Effectiveness demands firmness without confrontation and concern without condemnation. Impartiality is the required attitude.

The tactical is the political. Combat ready troops can perform lesser missions. The reverse is not true."³⁶ When LTG Zinni was asked whether the military should be doing MOOTW he simply stated, "whether we should or shouldn't, I'll tell you this – we are."³⁷

If the US Army's historical participation in MOOTW is any indication of its future then participation in MOOTW will happen more often than participation in war. The goal is to understand the environment and prepare for it.

Further historical writing is required on Operations Uphold Democracy. Specifically, the operations of the 25th Division and 3rd Brigades operations in northern Haiti need to be told. Telling the story of 3rd Brigade is important because it shows how a unit successfully prepared for operations in Haiti within a very short time frame, deployed to northern Haiti and conducted operations as a supporting effort to the 25th Division and the Operation Uphold Democracy.

Further research is necessary to examine the TRADOC POIs to ensure MOOTW is addressed at all levels of military education. Additionally, a review of tactical unit's MTPs to ensure they include a variety of conditions for the tactical tasks to build in the flexibility in training.




Figure 10. Special Military Training For Peace Operations, Program Evaluation." Inspector General Department of Defense, 14.

Finally, identification and definition of MOOTW specific tasks are necessary to assist leaders in clarifying the MOOTW specific missions. In combat a tactical unit attacks to "destroy" the enemy, with "destroy" as the tactical task. Army doctrine identifies and addresses combat tactical tasks. In MOOTW a tactical unit conducts a presence patrol to "do what?" The MOOTW tasks are not identified or defined in doctrine. Defining the

“tasks” in a MOOTW environment can reduce frustration lead to clarity and a common understanding in mission execution.

This story is one of many examples of soldiers in the United States Army that have conducted operations during the early Post Cold War. Their service to the country has been exceptional. Telling this story has been rewarding in the fact that the credit to the success of Operation Uphold Democracy and C Company’s participation are a direct reflection on the soldiers of the Company. Leaders can point them in the right direction but the credit for the professional execution of the mission goes to the soldiers. Well done C Company.

¹ Dr Lawrence Yates, “Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns and Recurring Themes,” *Military Review*, July August 1997.

² “Special Military Training For Peace Operations, Program Evaluation.” Inspector General Department of Defense. September 1994.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Dr Lawrence Yates, “Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns and Recurring Themes,” *Military Review*, July August 1997.

⁵ David Bently, “Operations Uphold Democracy: Military Support for Democracy in Haiti.” *Strategic Forum*. Institute for National Strategic Studies, Number 78, June 1996.

⁶ Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 25-101, *Battle Focused Training*, September 1990.

⁷ MG George A Fisher, interviewed by MAJ Burton Thompson, Jr., Joint History Interview Transcript Multinational Force Haiti, CDR MNF, 6 June 1995.

⁸ Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 100-5, *Army Operations*, 1993.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ MG George A Fisher, interviewed by MAJ Burton Thompson, Jr., Joint History Interview Transcript Multinational Force Haiti, CDR MNF, 6 June 1995.

¹¹ BG Lawson Magruder Jr, "Address at the Light Infantry Conference," 7 December 1993.

¹² The Joint Readiness Training Center conducted a total of seven MREs between 1993 and 1998.

¹³ COL J.P. Abizaid, COL J.R. Wood, "Preparing for Peacekeeping: Military Training and the Peacekeeping Environment," *Special Warfare Magazine* Vol. 7, No 2, April 1994, p. 14-20.

¹⁴ "Special Military Training For Peace Operations, Program Evaluation." Inspector General Department of Defense. September 1994.

¹⁵ COL J.P. Abizaid, COL J.R. Wood, "Preparing for Peacekeeping: Military Training and the Peacekeeping Environment," *Special Warfare Magazine* Vol. 7, No 2, April 1994, p. 14-20.

¹⁶ MAJ Bruce E. Stanley, Panel Discussion (Spain, Argentina, Great Britain) Notes, A522 Peace Operations, Department of Joint Military Operations, US Army Command and General Staff College, 11 February 1999.

¹⁷ CALL.

¹⁸ COL J.P. Abizaid, COL J.R. Wood, "Preparing for Peacekeeping: Military Training and the Peacekeeping Environment," *Special Warfare Magazine* Vol. 7, No 2, April 1994, p. 14-20.

¹⁹ LTG Anthony Zinni , "Its not nice and Neat," *Proceedings*, August 1995, p. 26-30.

²⁰ COL J.P. Abizaid, COL J.R. Wood, "Preparing for Peacekeeping: Military Training and the Peacekeeping Environment," *Special Warfare Magazine* Vol. 7, No 2, April 1994, p. 14-20.

²¹ Ibid, p 14-20.

²² MAJ Bruce E. Stanley, Panel Discussion (Spain, Argentina, Great Britain) Notes, A522 Peace Operations, Department of Joint Military Operations, US Army Command and General Staff College, 11 February 1999.

²³ COL J.P. Abizaid, COL J.R. Wood, "Preparing for Peacekeeping: Military Training and the Peacekeeping Environment," *Special Warfare Magazine* Vol. 7, No 2, April 1994, p. 14-20.

²⁴ Conference Report, "Peacekeeping: What Works? America's Future Peacekeeping Policy", United States Department of State, 7 February 1994.

²⁵ LTG Anthony Zinni, "Complex Humanitarian Emergencies, 20 Lessons Learned," Keynote address at the Center for Naval Analysis conference on "Military Support to Complex Humanitarian Emergencies," October 1995.

²⁶ Dr Lawrence Yates, "Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns and Recurring Themes," *Military Review*, July August 1997.

²⁷ MG S.L. Arnold and MAJ David T. Stahl, "A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War" *Parameters*, Winter 1993-1994, p.4-41.

²⁸ *Ibid*, p 4-41.

²⁹ COL J.P. Abizaid, COL J.R. Wood , "Preparing for Peacekeeping: Military Training and the Peacekeeping Environment," *Special Warfare Magazine*, Vol. 7, No 2, April 1994, p. 14-20.

³⁰ *Ibid*, p. 14-20.

³¹ MG S.L. Arnold and MAJ David T. Stahl, "A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War," *Parameters*, Winter 1993-1994, p.4-41.

³² It was not uncommon for C Company to conduct live fire training in the tire house with targets replicating civilians and using a restrictive or changing ROE.

³³ COL J.P. Abizaid, COL J.R. Wood, "Preparing for Peacekeeping: Military Training and the Peacekeeping Environment," *Special Warfare Magazine* Vol. 7, No 2, April 1994, p. 14-20.

³⁴ "Special Military Training For Peace Operations, Program Evaluation." Inspector General Department of Defense. September 1994.


³⁵ Dr Lawrence Yates, "Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns and Recurring Themes," *Military Review*, July August 1997, p.____.

³⁶ "Special Military Training For Peace Operations, Program Evaluation." Inspector General Department of Defense. September 1994.

³⁷ LTG Anthony Zinni, "It's not nice and Neat," *Proceedings*, August 1995, p. 26-30.

APPENDIX A
STX Lane Training

Platoon Fixed Site Security (Lane 1)
Platoon Presence Patrol (Lane 2)
Platoon Convoy/QRF (Lane 3)
Company Cordon and Search (Lane 4)



Military Operations In Urban Terrain (MOUT)
CTF Training Site. Schofield Barracks, HI

APPENDIX B

CQC TRAINING PLAN

THE CQC TRAINING PLAN IS A SEVEN DAY EVENT THAT INCLUDES LEADER AND UNIT TRAINING. THE ASSUMPTIONS ARE THAT SEVEN DAYS ARE AVAILABLE. ALL THE REQUESTED RANGES AND AMMUNITION IS AVAILABLE. A CADRE IS AVAILABLE TO FACILITATE THE TRAINING FOR THE TRAINED UNIT. LEADER TRAINING INVOLVES TEAM LEADER AND ABOVE AND UNIT TRAINING IS PARTIALLY BY THE CADRE AND PARTIALLY BY THE UNIT LEADERS.

OVERVIEW OF TRAINING DAYS

DAY 1:
LEADER TRAINING: MARKSMANSHIP
UNIT TRAINING: TRAINING OVERVIEW/PREP FOR FIELD

DAY 2:
LEADER TRAINING: CQC (MOUT SITE)
UNIT TRAINING: MARKSMANSHIP

DAY 3:
LEADER TRAINING: CQC (TIRE HOUSE)
UNIT TRAINING: MARKSMANSHIP

DAY 4:
LEADER TRAINING: MISSION PLANNING/MOUT CONSIDERATIONS
UNIT TRAINING: CQC (MOUT SITE)

DAY 5:
UNIT TRAINING: CQC (MOUT SITE)

DAY 6:
UNIT TRAINING: CQC (TIRE HOUSE)

DAY 7:
UNIT TRAINING: CQC (TIRE HOUSE)

DAY 1

LEADER TRAINING: (TEAM LEADER AND ABOVE)

TASK: CQC TRAINING OVERVIEW

TASK: MARKSMANSHIP TRAINING

SUBTASK: REFLEXIVE SHOOTING (TABLES 1-5)

SUBTASK: TARGET DISCRIMINATION DRILLS (TABLE 6-8)

SUBTASK: MARKSMANSHIP EVALUATION (TABLES 10-13)

CONDITIONS: DAY/NIGHT (w/NVG's) LIVE FIRE

CR-3, MF-2, MF-3, MF-4

COMMITTEE FACILITATES TRAINING

UNIT TRAINING: (PSG SUPERVISED)

TASK: PREP FOR FIELD

TASK: CQC TRAINING OVERVIEW

DAY 2

LEADER TRAINING: (TEAM LEADER AND ABOVE)

TASK: CQC

SUBTASK: ENTER AND CLEAR SINGLE ROOM w/SINGLE TEAM

SUBTASK: ENTER AND CLEAR MULTI ROOM w/SINGLE TEAM

SUBTASK: ENTER AND CLEAR MULTI ROOM w/MULTI TEAM

SUBTASK: CLEAR A STAIRWELL

SUBTASK: CLEAR A HALLWAY

CONDITIONS: MOUT FACILITY

DAY/NIGHT BLANK FIRE

COMMITTEE FACILITATES TRAINING

UNIT TRAINING:

TASK: MARKSMANSHIP

SUBTASK: REFLEXIVE SHOOTING (TABLES 1-5)

SUBTASK: TARGET DISCRIMINATION (TABLES 6-8)

CONDITIONS: DAY/NIGHT(w/NVG's) LIVE FIRE
COMMITTEE FACILITATES TRAINING
CR-3, MF-2, MF-3, MF-4

DAY 3

LEADER TRAINING: (TEAM LEADER AND ABOVE)

TASK: CQC

SUBTASK: ENTER AND CLEAR SINGLE ROOM w/SINGLE TEAM

SUBTASK: ENTER AND CLEAR MULTI ROOM w/SINGLE TEAM

SUBTASK: ENTER AND CLEAR MULTI ROOM w/MULTI TEAM

CONDITIONS: TIRE HOUSE (TR-2)
DAY/NIGHT BLANK/LIVE FIRE (w/NVG's)
COMMITTEE FACILITATES TRAINING
SCENARIOS INCLUDE: ALL ENEMY IN ROOM
ENEMY AND NON COMBATANT IN ROOM
USE OF GRENADES

UNIT TRAINING:

TASK: MARKSMANSHIP EVALUATION (TABLES 10-13)

CONDITIONS: DAY/NIGHT (w/NVG's) LIVE FIRE

DAY 4

UNIT TRAINING:

TASK: CQC

SUBTASK: ENTER AND CLEAR SINGLE ROOM w/SINGLE TEAM

SUBTASK: ENTER AND CLEAR MULTI ROOM w/SINGLE TEAM

SUBTASK: ENTER AND CLEAR MULTI ROOM w/MULTI TEAM

SUBTASK: CLEAR A STAIRWELL

SUBTASK: CLEAR A HALLWAY

CONDITIONS: MOUT FACILITY

DAY/NIGHT BLANK FIRE

UNIT FACILITATES TRAINING, COMMITTEE VALIDATES TRAINING

LEADER TRAINING: (SQUAD LEADER AND ABOVE)

TASK: MISSION PLANNING/MOUT CONSIDERATIONS

CONDITIONS: FIELD CLASSROOM/MOUT SITE

DAY 5

UNIT TRAINING:

TASK: CQC

SUBTASK: ENTER AND CLEAR SINGLE ROOM w/SINGLE TEAM

SUBTASK: ENTER AND CLEAR MULTI ROOM w/SINGLE TEAM

SUBTASK: ENTER AND CLEAR MULTI ROOM w/MULTI TEAM

SUBTASK: CLEAR A STAIRWELL

SUBTASK: CLEAR A HALLWAY

CONDITIONS: MOUT FACILITY

DAY/NIGHT BLANK FIRE

UNIT FACILITATES TRAINING, COMMITTEE VALIDATES TRAINING

*** WHEN TEAMS AND SQUADS DEMONSTRATE PROFICIENCY THEY MOVE TO AND BEGIN TRAINING AT THE TIRE HOUSE.

LEADER TRAINING (PLATOON LEADER AND ABOVE)

TASK: MOUT PLANNING AND OPERATIONS

DAY 6 & 7

UNIT TRAINING:

TASK: CQC

SUBTASK: ENTER AND CLEAR SINGLE ROOM w/SINGLE TEAM

SUBTASK: ENTER AND CLEAR MULTI ROOM w/SINGLE TEAM

SUBTASK: ENTER AND CLEAR MULTI ROOM w/MULTI TEAM

CONDITIONS: TIRE HOUSE (TR-2)

DAY/NIGHT BLANK/LIVE FIRE (w/NVG's)

COMMITTEE FACILITATES TRAINING

SCENARIOS INCLUDE: ALL ENEMY IN ROOM

ENEMY AND NON COMBATANT IN ROOM

USE OF GRENADES

LEADER/SPECIALIZED TRAINING (AS TIME PERMITS, POSSIBLY ON DAY 7):

TASK: M203 MARKSMANSHIP

TASK: MOVEMENT IN A MOUT ENVIRONMENT

TASK: SNIPER/DESIGNATED SHOOTER EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING

TASK: MARKSMANSHIP (MOUT ASSAULT COURSE)

TASK: DEMOLITION/DES TRAINING (SELECTED LEADERS OR INDIVIDUALS)

TASK: GRENADE TRAINING

SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

TRAINING AREAS: MOUT SITE

RANGES: CR-2
CR-3
MF-2
MF-3
MF-4
TR-2
KR-1 (MAC)
KR-9 (M203)

AMMUNITION:

* NUMBERS BASED ON ONE SOLDIER TRAINED ON ALL TABLES, CQC, TR-2, AND ADDITIONAL TRAINING.

5.56 BALL:	1,167
5.56 BLANK	260
GRENADE FUSE	8
FRAG GRENADE	4
M203 TPT	10

APPENDIX C
Initial Counseling

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
COMPANY C, 4TH BATTALION, 87TH INFANTRY
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION (LIGHT)
SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, HAWAII 96857

APVG-ZZC-C

16 December 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR LIGHT INFANTRY SQUAD LEADERS

SUBJECT: Initial Counseling For Haiti Deployment

1. Purpose. Provide Rifle Company Squad Leaders with initial counseling, objectives, and guidance for the train-up and deployment to Operations Restore Democracy.
2. Overview.
 - a. This memorandum discusses my expectations of you as a squad leader in this company.
 - b. Keep in mind our success as leaders depends directly on the soldiers we lead. Your technical and tactical proficiency and leadership skills will be the vehicle to the respect and trust your soldiers and non-commissioned officers give you.
3. Discussion. I want you to focus your efforts in several areas. Training, Team Building, Discipline, and Operations.
 - a. Training. This is critical to the success of our mission. First you and your leaders must be experts at knowing and training your soldiers on the tasks in the Peacekeeping Operations MTP, the CQC manual, FM 7-8, the ROE, and the vignettes provided. Next you must train your soldiers quickly and to standard prior to deployment. Do not waste one minute. It is a crime to waste soldier's time or to take the easy path now. A soldier's life may be in jeopardy if you do not train right the first time. Finally, training does not stop once we arrive in country. Every available minute should be used to train, retrain, rehearse, conduct AARs, and backbriefs. Do not rest on the idea that everyone knows what to do so we don't have to train. I do not expect for you to be friends or to be liked by your soldiers or leaders. If you train them hard this will build their confidence, and ultimately respect for you. You have heard it before but the more sweat in training means the less amount of blood shed on the battlefield.

APVG-ZZC-C

SUBJECT: Initial Counseling For Haiti Deployment

b. Team Building. You must quickly integrate all personnel in your squad and build a team. This is done through PT, field training, and sport activities. Use your NCOs to help you with this. Your squad should act as one. The stronger your squad is as a team they better they will perform for you. Do this quickly and continue to work on it before the deployment and during the operations in country. Do everything as a squad.

c. Discipline. This starts with you. Set high standards and maintain them. You enforce them with your leaders and make them enforce them with the soldiers. That means everything. From conducting collective training to appearance. Do it right, make everyone else do it right and they will start to achieve that standard. Then do not back off. There are many leadership styles for this. Pick the one that is best for you and do it. If I am making a correction in your squad you are wrong and your leaders are wrong. You do it first before the First Sergeant or I do.

d. Operations. Conducting operations in country will be a continual challenge and a learning experience for everyone. You must be confident, know when to act, react, and ask for help. You must use all the things taught to you in NCOES schools, your experience, and this unit to succeed. Know and use the ROE always, our success depends on it. I will give you task, purpose, and commander's intent. I expect you to execute. We may not always have time for explanation or tactical discussion. Use your experience, your NCOs, and your best judgement to do what is right the first time.

4. Additional Thoughts.

- a. Lead from the front.
- b. Always set the example.
- c. Know your job cold. Be the smartest infantryman in your squad in all aspects of this business.
- d. Be loyal to your soldiers, NCOs, the unit, and the chain of command.
- e. Always tell the truth.
- f. Don't hide bad news, it does not get better with age.
- g. Take care of your soldiers and they will take care of you.
- h. Always know where your soldiers are (keep accountability).
- i. Always backbrief and require backbriefs of your subordinates.
- j. Conduct AARs after everything you do.
- k. Conduct maintenance and inspect it. This is something that will not be done right if you do not check.
 - l. Keep good accountability of your equipment.
 - m. Do what is right even when know one is looking.
 - n. Take the initiative, but use good judgement.
 - o. Be early on all suspense. To be early is to be on time. To be on time is to be late.

APVG-ZZC-C

SUBJECT: Initial Counseling For Haiti Deployment

- p. Don't miss a meeting.
- q. Counsel your subordinates, both good and bad. Their performance will improve if you tell them where they stand.
- r. Be hard not harsh. There is a big difference.
- s. Always be fair.
- t. Train your platoon leader. He belongs to you. His success and the future of the Army depends directly on how you train him. His success means your success.
- u. The squad leaders and platoon sergeant should be of one voice. Work problems out as professional NCOs behind closed doors.
- v. Train your junior NCOs, they are the nations future Professional Non Commissioned Officer Corps. Your training and example will influence them for the rest of their careers.
- w. No accidental discharges. You are responsible and will be held personally accountable for this.

5. Conclusion.


I will continue to give you guidance as time goes on. I wish you the best of luck in training and operations. The nation has put the lives of soldiers in our hands, it is our responsibility to take care of them. Be humble yet confident in this task.

BRUCE E. STANLEY
CPT, IN
Commanding

APPENDIX D
Battalion Mission Schedule

	Requirement	SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THUR	FRI	SAT
AF/FARRP/ Detainee/Wash Rack/Camp Security	4 Squads	C Co	B Co					
AO Fairbanks (mounted)	SQD (+)	MTR w/Sqd B Co/Psy	MTR w/Sqd B Co/Psy	MTR w/Sqd B Co/Psy	MTR w/Sqd B Co/Psy	MTR w/Sqd B Co/Psy	MTR w/Sqd B Co/Psy	MTR w/Sqd A Co/Psy
AO Fairbanks (dismounted)	PLT	B Co	A Co,Sct					
AO St Louis (dismounted)	PLT	B Co/AT Plt/PSY	B Co/AT Plt/PSY	B Co/AT Plt/PSY	B Co/AT Plt/PSY	B Co/AT Plt/PSY	B Co/AT Plt/PSY	ADA, w/Plt A Co, PSY
Escorts	PLT	ADA w/Sqd B Co	AT Plt					
QRF	PLT(+)	B Co, ADA	A Co, ADA					
WBB	1 Off w/fire tm	C Co	B Co					
OOS/MWR/ TNG	Co Tm	A Co, Scts	C Co, Scts					

APPENDIX E
Base Camp Configuration



APPENDIX F
Battalion Mission Schedule

CO	PLT	S	19	M	20	T	21	W	22	TH	23	F	24	S	25												
A	1	C	G	C	C	G	T	C	G	C	C	G	Q	C	POW												
		T	C	G	C	C	G	T	C	G	C	Q	G	POW	POW												
	2	G	T	C	G	C	C	G	T	C	G	C	Q	G	Q												
		C	G	T	C	G	C	C	G	T	C	G	Q	Q	Q												
	3	C	C	G	T	C	G	C	C	G	T	C	G	Q	Q												
		G	C	C	G	T	C	G	C	C	G	Q	Q	Q	Q												
B	1	C	C	C	C	C	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P												
		C	C	C	C	C	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P												
	2	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	C	C	P												
		O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	C	C	P												
	3	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	C	C	Q												
		O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	C	C	Q												
C	1	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	G												
		R	P	R	P	P	P	R	P	R	P	R	P	R	T												
	2	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	T												
		R	P	R	P	P	P	R	P	R	P	R	P	R	G												
	3	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	T												
		Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	G	R												
SCTS	P	P	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C												
		P	P	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C												
MTR	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P												
		P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P												
AT	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	P												
		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	P												
ADA	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P												
		P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P												
ADA	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	E												
		Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	Q	E												
OOS: OOCIS				G: AF SECURITY				B: BEACH				E: ESCORTS															
O: OOS				PCI: PCI				R: RECOVERY				2O: 2ND OOS															
P: PATROL				C: COMPTIME				T: TRAINING				CIT: CITADEL															
Q: QRF				F: FISH				RE: REHEARSALS				POW: POWER															
STATION																											
TIME REFERENCE:																											
2400-0600				1200-																							
1800																											
0600-1200				1800-																							

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
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